Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Several businesses involved in the cultivation, distribution, and sale of hemp products in Wyoming and elsewhere challenged a Wyoming statute, Senate Enrolled Act 24 (SEA 24), which significantly altered the state’s regulation of hemp. SEA 24 narrowed the definition of hemp to exclude synthetic substances and expanded the definition of THC to include both delta-9 and delta-8 THC, requiring that the combined concentration not exceed 0.3%. The law also added both naturally occurring and synthetic delta-8 THC to Wyoming’s Schedule I controlled substances, making it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess hemp products exceeding the new THC limits or containing synthetic substances, even if such products are legal under federal law.After SEA 24 was enacted, the plaintiffs filed a preenforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that SEA 24 was preempted by the federal 2018 Farm Bill, violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and was void for vagueness. The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The district court denied the motion for preliminary relief and subsequently dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that most defendants were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the remaining claims lacked legal merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a substantial federal right to support their preemption claim, failed to demonstrate a Dormant Commerce Clause violation, did not establish a regulatory taking of their commercial personal property, and did not show that SEA 24 was unconstitutionally vague. The court also dismissed the appeal of the denial of preliminary relief as moot due to the dismissal of the complaint. View "Green Room v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A group of out-of-state pig farmers and a pork processor challenged a Massachusetts law that prohibits the use of certain confinement methods for breeding pigs (specifically, gestation crates) and bans the sale in Massachusetts of pork products derived from pigs confined in such a manner. The plaintiffs, who operate outside Massachusetts and use these confinement methods, argued that the law discriminates against out-of-state producers and is preempted by federal statutes. The law was enacted by ballot initiative and became enforceable after the Supreme Court’s decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims, including those based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, preemption by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Import-Export Clause. The court allowed the dormant Commerce Clause claim to proceed, but ultimately granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on that claim as well, after severing a provision of the law that it found discriminatory (the “slaughterhouse exemption”). The court found that the remaining provisions of the law did not discriminate against out-of-state interests and did not impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts law does not discriminate against out-of-state producers in purpose or effect, does not impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test, and is not preempted by the FMIA or PSA. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Due Process Clause, and Import-Export Clause. The court found no procedural error in the district court’s handling of the case. View "Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Alan Juliuson rented three tracts of farmland from various owners, collectively referred to as Johnson, for over 40 years. In 2018, he contracted to farm the property until December 2021, with an option to renew and a right of first refusal to purchase the property. Towards the end of the lease, Johnson proposed new lease terms that increased the rent, removed the right of first refusal, and included a termination clause if the property was sold. Juliuson did not respond to these terms and later offered to purchase the property, which Johnson rejected, selling it instead to Bjerke Holdings, LLLP.Juliuson sued Johnson, Bjerke, and Farmers National Company (FNC) for various claims, including breach of contract, specific performance, and deceit. The district court dismissed several claims through summary judgment and ruled against Juliuson on others after a jury trial. The jury found no breach of the right of first refusal or the option to renew. Juliuson’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law were denied.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict that Johnson did not breach the lease renewal option or the right of first refusal. The court also upheld the dismissal of Juliuson’s claims for specific performance, finding no breach of contract to warrant such a remedy. Additionally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the claims for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and deceit, as these claims were not supported by independent tortious conduct separate from the alleged breach of contract. The district court’s judgment dismissing Juliuson’s claims with prejudice was affirmed. View "Juliuson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A farm in Talbot County, Maryland, was the subject of nuisance complaints from neighboring residents due to offensive odors and swarms of insects. The farm, owned by Arthur L. Foster, Sr., and later managed by his son, Arthur L. Foster, Jr., began receiving Class A biosolids and soil conditioners from Denali Water Solutions in January 2021. These materials were stored and applied to the farm, causing strong, foul odors and a midge infestation, which led to numerous complaints from nearby residents.The Talbot County Agricultural Resolution Board (the Board) conducted an investigation and held hearings to determine whether the practices at the farm were generally accepted agricultural practices under Talbot County's Right to Farm (RTF) law, Chapter 128 of the Talbot County Code (TCC). The Board found that the application and stockpiling of the materials were generally accepted agricultural practices and issued recommendations to mitigate the odor.The Circuit Court for Talbot County reversed the Board's decision, finding that the agricultural operations on the farm had not been in existence for one year or more when the complaints were filed, as required by Maryland's RTF law, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-403. The court remanded the case to the Board with instructions to find that the operations did not benefit from protection under the RTF laws.The Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the Circuit Court's decision, holding that the expanded use of soil conditioners and biosolids at the farm was a protected activity under both the state and county RTF laws. The court found substantial evidence supporting the Board's decision that the practices were generally accepted agricultural practices and did not violate public health, safety, and welfare.The Supreme Court of Maryland reversed the Appellate Court's decision, holding that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The court found that the Board failed to make necessary findings regarding the public health, safety, and welfare impacts of the practices and did not adequately consider whether the stockpiling of materials for use at other locations was a generally accepted agricultural practice. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "In re: Foster Farm" on Justia Law

Robbie Plyler, a longtime farm worker, was injured when his leg became trapped in a running grain auger inside a grain bin on Cox Brothers Farms, resulting in the amputation of his right leg below the knee. The jury found that both Plyler and Cox Brothers Farms were negligent, but the farm had the last clear chance to avoid the injury. The jury awarded Plyler $2,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 for loss of consortium to his wife, Deborah. Cox Brothers Farms appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina denied Cox's pre-trial motions for summary judgment and its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on Plyler’s negligence and gross negligence claims. The court also denied Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial into separate liability and damages phases and its motion to exclude testimony from Plyler’s farm safety expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the jury’s verdict. The court found that the district court did not err in denying Cox's motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Cox had the last clear chance to avoid Plyler’s injury. The appellate court also upheld the district court’s decision to deny Cox's motion to bifurcate the trial and to admit the expert testimony, noting that the district court provided appropriate limiting instructions to the jury regarding the use of OSHA regulations as evidence. The court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion and that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting a new trial. View "Plyler v. Cox" on Justia Law

A Puerto Rico-based poultry importer, Northwestern Selecta, Inc. (NWS), challenged a regulation by the Puerto Rico Department of Agriculture (PRDA) requiring a PRDA inspector to be present when shipping containers of poultry meat are opened and unloaded. NWS argued that this requirement is preempted by the federal Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), which regulates the inspection and distribution of poultry products. The PPIA includes a preemption clause that prohibits states from imposing additional or different requirements on official establishments beyond those established by the PPIA.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico agreed with NWS, finding that the PRDA's inspector requirement falls within the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and is not exempted by the PPIA's savings clause. The district court granted declaratory relief to NWS and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation against NWS. The PRDA appealed the decision, arguing that the district court misinterpreted the scope of the PPIA's preemption clause and the application of the savings clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the PPIA's preemption clause broadly covers state regulations related to the operations of official establishments, which includes the opening and unloading of shipping containers at NWS's facility. The court found that the PRDA's inspector requirement directly impacts NWS's operations and is therefore preempted by the PPIA. Additionally, the court determined that the savings clause does not exempt the PRDA's regulation from preemption because it does not apply to poultry products outside of NWS's facility. Consequently, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, upholding the permanent injunction against the enforcement of the PRDA's regulation. View "Northwestern Selecta, Inc. v. Gonzalez-Beiro" on Justia Law

Marjorie Johnson, the owner of farmland, was denied a permit by the Village of Polk to drill a new well for irrigating her farmland. She sought a declaratory judgment that the ordinance requiring a permit for new wells in the village’s wellhead protection area was invalid, arguing it was preempted by the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and violated state law by interfering with her existing farming operations.The district court for Polk County denied her request for declaratory judgment and her petition in error. The court found that the ordinance was not preempted by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature intended for both local natural resources districts (NRDs) and municipalities to have control over water sources. The court also found that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the land was previously irrigated through an agreement with a neighbor, and it was the dispute with the neighbor, not the ordinance, that resulted in the land being dryland.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the ordinance was enacted under the necessary statutory grant of power to the municipality, as the Wellhead Protection Area Act and other statutes granted villages the authority to adopt controls to protect public water supplies. The court also found no field or conflict preemption by the NGWMPA, as the Legislature did not intend to deprive municipalities of their statutory authority to require permits for wells within wellhead protection areas. Finally, the court agreed that the ordinance did not interfere with Johnson’s existing farming operations, as the existing farming at the time of the permit request was dryland farming, and it was the neighbor’s actions, not the ordinance, that prevented irrigation. View "Johnson v. Village of Polk" on Justia Law

Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the "Ra factor." They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA's rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA's test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program's sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law

Conmac Investments, Inc., an Arkansas company, owns, leases, and manages farms. Between 2004 and 2013, Conmac purchased farmland and negotiated to receive rights to "base acres," which entitle the owner to subsidy payments from the USDA. Initially, Conmac did not claim deductions for amortization of these base acres on its tax returns from 2004 to 2008. In 2009, Conmac began amortizing its base acres without filing an "Application for Change of Accounting Method" and claimed amortization deductions for the years 2009 through 2014. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions, leading Conmac to petition the Tax Court.The United States Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, determining that Conmac's decision to amortize base acres constituted a change in the method of accounting, which required IRS approval. Conmac appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, holding that Conmac's initiation of amortization for base acres in 2009 was indeed a change in the method of accounting. According to Treasury Regulation § 1.446-1(e)(2)(ii)(d)(2), changing the treatment of an asset from nonamortizable to amortizable is a change in the method of accounting. The court rejected Conmac's argument that the change was due to a change in underlying facts, noting that Conmac's realization about the amortization of base acres did not constitute a change in underlying facts but rather a change in the timing of cost recovery.The court also addressed the Section 481 adjustment, concluding that the "year of the change" was 2013, when the Commissioner changed Conmac's method of accounting, thus triggering the adjustment to prevent duplicated deductions or omitted income. The judgment of the Tax Court was affirmed. View "Conmac Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Landowners Stephen and Sharon Wille Padnos appealed two Environmental Division decisions that granted summary judgment to landowner Jason Struthers. The court ruled that the City of Essex Junction could not regulate Struthers' duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations. The court found that the duck-raising operation was exempt from municipal regulation under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) as it constituted a commercial farming operation subject to the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) Rule. Additionally, the court concluded that the City could not enforce its zoning regulations on Struthers' cannabis-cultivation operations under 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2).The City’s zoning regulations do not permit agricultural, farming, or cannabis-cultivation establishments in the Residential-1 Zoning District. The City’s zoning officer initially declined to enforce these regulations against Struthers. The City’s Development Review Board (DRB) reversed the zoning officer’s decision regarding the duck-raising operation but upheld it for the cannabis-cultivation operation. The Environmental Division later granted summary judgment in favor of Struthers in both cases, concluding that the City could not regulate the duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that neither 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) nor 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2) exempts Struthers' operations from all municipal regulation. The court clarified that § 4413(d)(1)(A) prohibits municipal regulation of the specific agricultural practices required by the RAPs Rule, not all farming activities subject to the RAPs Rule. Similarly, § 869(f)(2) prevents municipal regulation of licensed outdoor cannabis cultivators only concerning the water-quality standards established by the RAPs Rule, not all aspects of cannabis cultivation. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division’s decisions and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re 8 Taft Street DRB & NOV Appeals" on Justia Law