Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

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The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by Protect the Peninsula, Inc. to intervene as a matter of right in an action brought by a group of wineries and an association representing their interests (collectively, the Wineries) against a Michigan municipality over several zoning ordinances that regulate vineyards, holding that the district court erred.Protect the Peninsula, Inc., a local advocacy group, moved to intervene in this action brought against Peninsula Township challenging the zoning ordinances regulating the vineyards' activities as unconstitutional and in violation of state laws. Protect the Peninsula moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), but the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Protect the Peninsula satisfied each of Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements. View "Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass'n v. Township of Peninsula, Michigan" on Justia Law

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This appeal stemmed from mass litigation between thousands of corn producers and an agricultural company (Syngenta). On one track, corn producers filed individual suits against Syngenta; on the second, other corn producers sued through class actions. The appellants were some of the corn producers who took the first track, filing individual actions. (the “Kellogg farmers.”) The Kellogg farmers alleged that their former attorneys had failed to disclose the benefits of participating as class members, resulting in excessive legal fees and exclusion from class proceedings. These allegations led the Kellogg farmers to sue the attorneys who had provided representation or otherwise assisted in these cases. The suit against the attorneys included claims of common-law fraud, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO) and Minnesota’s consumer-protection statutes, and breach of fiduciary duty. While this suit was pending in district court, Syngenta settled the class actions and thousands of individual suits, including those brought by the Kellogg farmers. The settlement led to the creation of two pools of payment by Syngenta: one pool for a newly created class consisting of all claimants, the other pool for those claimants’ attorneys. For this settlement, the district court allowed the Kellogg farmers to participate in the new class and to recover on an equal basis with all other claimants. The settlement eliminated any economic injury to the Kellogg farmers, so the district court dismissed the RICO and common-law fraud claims. The court not only dismissed these claims but also assessed monetary sanctions against the Kellogg farmers. The farmers appealed certain district court decisions, but finding that there was no reversible error or that it lacked jurisdiction to review certain decisions, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. View "Kellogg, et al. v. Watts Guerra, et al." on Justia Law

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At the culmination of a five-month rulemaking, the Department of Agriculture announced a final rule designed to protect show horses from abuse. As required by the Federal Register Act, the agency transmitted the signed rule to the Office of the Federal Register, which made it available for public inspection. But on the day President Trump took the oath of office, his Chief of Staff directed executive agencies to withdraw all pending rules.    The Humane Society filed suit along with four of its members challenging the rule’s withdrawal. It principally claims that the Department unlawfully repealed the rule without notice and comment or the reasoned decision-making that the Administrative Procedure Act requires. The district court dismissed, agreeing with the government that a rule becomes final only upon Federal Register publication. The question, in this case, is whether an agency must provide notice and an opportunity for comment when withdrawing a rule that has been filed for public inspection but not yet published in the Federal Register.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court's order dismissing The Humane Society’s suit against the United States Department of Agriculture. The court held that because a rule made available for public inspection prescribes law with legal consequences for regulated parties, the APA requires the agency to undertake notice and comment before repealing it. View "Humane Society of the United States v. AGRI" on Justia Law

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Produce Pay holds a Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act ("PACA") license issued by the United States Department of Agriculture. Produce Pay and Izguerra agreed that Izguerra, through Produce Pay’s online platform, would receive and accept produce from a grower and sell the produce to retailers on Produce Pay's behalf. Izguerra bought 1,600 cartons of avocados from Produce Pay through its online platform and, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, received the avocados directly from the Mexican grower. Produce Pay issued Izguerra an invoice representing the net proceeds from the avocados, but Izguerra did not fully pay. The district court dismissed Produce Pay’s PACA claims on the ground that, as a matter of law, Produce Pay was not a seller of wholesale produce, and thus not entitled to PACA protections, because the transaction between Produce Pay and Izguerra was a secured loan rather than a true sale.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6) dismissal. The court held that Produce Pay alleged the five preliminary elements of a PACA claim by alleging that the avocados were perishable, Izguerra was a dealer of avocados, the transaction occurred in contemplation of interstate or foreign commerce, Produce Pay did not receive full payment, and the invoice for the avocados stated that they were sold subject to a PACA statutory trust. Further, Produce Pay plausibly alleged that it was a seller or supplier under PACA, rather than only a lender, because Produce Pay alleged facts that resembled a consignment transaction between it and Izguerra and suggested that Produce Pay functioned as a seller. View "PRODUCE PAY, INC. V. IZGUERRA PRODUCE, INC." on Justia Law

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The Hopkinses kept cattle on their Marshall County, Tennessee farm. Detective Nichols received a complaint about the treatment of those cattle, drove by, and observed one dead cow and others that did not appear to be in good health. Nichols returned with Tennessee Department of Agriculture Veterinarian Johnson. Wearing his gun and badge, Nichols knocked and. according to Mrs. Hopkins, “demanded that [she] escort them to see the cattle,” refusing to wait until Mr. Hopkins returned or until she fed her children. Johnson completed a Livestock Welfare Examination, as required by law, noting that the cattle were not in reasonable health, that they lacked access to appropriate water, food, or shelter, and that major disease issues were present; she determined that probable cause for animal cruelty existed. Nichols returned to the Hopkins’s farm several times and discovered a sinkhole containing the remains of multiple cattle. Nichols and Sheriff Lamb eventually seized the cattle without a warrant and initiated criminal proceedings. The cattle were sold.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Forced compliance with orders is a Fourth Amendment seizure; words that compel compliance with orders to exit a house constitute a seizure. While the open fields doctrine allowed the officers to lawfully search the farm, it did not give them lawful access to seize the cattle; they lacked exigent circumstances when they seized the cattle. View "Hopkins v. Nichols" on Justia Law

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A dairy farmer looking to expand the market to which he could sell butter challenged the Food and Drug Administration's ("FDA") decades-old rule barring the interstate sale of raw butter. The farmer proposed a new rule that would allow such sales, claiming that by including raw butter in the definition of "butter" under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the FDA unlawfully changed the statutory definition of butter. The FDA rejected the farmer's proposal and the district court granted summary judgment to the FDA.The D.C. Circuit affirmed. As a preliminary matter, the court found all but one of the farmer's claims were waived on appeal. His remaining claim--that the FDA's regulation banning interstate sale of raw butter violates the FDCA’s definition of butter--failed because the FDA reasonably concluded that raw butter was too dangerous to be sold interstate. View "Mark McAfee v. FDA" on Justia Law

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Various members of the Hemp Industries Association ("Members") challenged a DEA rule emoving Epidiolex as a Schedule V controlled substance as well as the accompanying import-export controls over the substance. The DEA removed Epidiolex after the passage of the Farm Bill, which relaxed regulation of the cannabis plant.The D.C. Circuit dismissed the Members' petition, finding that they lacked standing. The Members were unable to show that they suffered any injury as a result of the DEA rule. The Members did not claim that they produce Epidiolex or that Epidiolex manufacturers compete with the Members. View "Hemp Industries Association v. DEA" on Justia Law

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Various members of the Hemp Industries Association ("Association") sought declaratory and injunctive relief following a DEA rule passed in the wake of the Farm bill. The Association specifically wanted to prevent the DEA from enforcing the CSA as it related to two byproducts of the hemp-extract production process. The district court dismissed the Association's claim, finding that it impermissibly challenged the DEA rule by failing to use the statutory review provision for rules promulgated under the Controlled Substances Act.The D.C. Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not err in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Association's claims seek review of issues that were outside the scheme set forth in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 877. View "Hemp Industries Association v. DEA" on Justia Law

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CSIRO, a research arm of the Australian government, owns six U.S. patents, concerning the engineering of plants, particularly canola, to produce specified oils not native to the plants. After the resolution of jurisdiction and venue issues in an infringement case against BASF and Cargill, the case proceeded to trial on eight claims of the six patents. The parties stipulated to infringement of five patents; the jury found infringement of the sixth. The jury rejected invalidity challenges, including the challenge that the asserted patent claims lacked adequate written-description support. The jury found that BASF co-owned one patent (precluding infringement of that patent) but not the others. The district court ruled that the evidence would not support a finding of willfulness, denied a conduct-stopping injunction, and granted an ongoing royalty on all five patents found infringed.The Federal Circuit affirmed that Eastern District of Virginia venue was proper and affirmed the verdict rejecting the written-description challenge to the claims that are limited to canola plants but reversed as to the broader genus claims. The court agreed that five patents were not co-owned by BASF but reversed the contrary verdict as to the sixth, so that infringement of all valid claims of the six patents is now settled. The court upheld the district court’s refusal to submit willfulness to the jury and its decision on an evidentiary issue concerning past damages but remanded for reconsideration of the remedy. View "BASF Plant Science, LP v. Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Robin Thornton and Michael Lucero alleged defendants Tyson Foods, Inc., Cargill Meat Solutions, Corp., JBS USA Food Company, and National Beef Packing Company, LLC, used deceptive and misleading labels on their beef products. In particular, plaintiffs contended the “Product of the U.S.A.” label on defendants’ beef products was misleading and deceptive in violation of New Mexico law because the beef products did not originate from cattle born and raised in the United States. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the federal agency tasked with ensuring the labels were not misleading or deceptive preapproved the labels at issue here. In seeking to establish that defendants’ federally approved labels were nevertheless misleading and deceptive under state law, plaintiffs sought to impose labeling requirements that were different than or in addition to the federal requirements. The Tenth Circuit concluded plaintiffs’ deceptive-labeling claims were expressly preempted by federal law. Further, the Court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for false advertising. View "Thornton, et al. v. Tyson Foods, et al." on Justia Law