Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Agriculture Law
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Landowners Stephen and Sharon Wille Padnos appealed two Environmental Division decisions that granted summary judgment to landowner Jason Struthers. The court ruled that the City of Essex Junction could not regulate Struthers' duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations. The court found that the duck-raising operation was exempt from municipal regulation under 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) as it constituted a commercial farming operation subject to the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) Rule. Additionally, the court concluded that the City could not enforce its zoning regulations on Struthers' cannabis-cultivation operations under 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2).The City’s zoning regulations do not permit agricultural, farming, or cannabis-cultivation establishments in the Residential-1 Zoning District. The City’s zoning officer initially declined to enforce these regulations against Struthers. The City’s Development Review Board (DRB) reversed the zoning officer’s decision regarding the duck-raising operation but upheld it for the cannabis-cultivation operation. The Environmental Division later granted summary judgment in favor of Struthers in both cases, concluding that the City could not regulate the duck-raising and cannabis-cultivation operations.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that neither 24 V.S.A. § 4413(d)(1)(A) nor 7 V.S.A. § 869(f)(2) exempts Struthers' operations from all municipal regulation. The court clarified that § 4413(d)(1)(A) prohibits municipal regulation of the specific agricultural practices required by the RAPs Rule, not all farming activities subject to the RAPs Rule. Similarly, § 869(f)(2) prevents municipal regulation of licensed outdoor cannabis cultivators only concerning the water-quality standards established by the RAPs Rule, not all aspects of cannabis cultivation. Consequently, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the Environmental Division’s decisions and remanded the cases for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re 8 Taft Street DRB & NOV Appeals" on Justia Law

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Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, submitted a request to pool ground water from several registered wells for the 2023-2027 allocation period. The Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) denied their application, citing a rule that allows denial for any reason, including rule violations. The denial was communicated through a letter and a marked application. The Hauxwells challenged this denial, alleging it violated their constitutional rights and was arbitrary and capricious.The Hauxwells filed a petition for review with the district court for Frontier County, Nebraska, under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They argued that the denial was contrary to a court order staying penalties previously imposed by the NRD. The NRD moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the letter was not a final agency action or an order in a contested case, and thus not subject to judicial review under the APA. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the letter did not arise from a contested case and was not a final order of the decision-making body.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the letter denying the Hauxwells' pooling application was not an "order" as defined under the NGWMPA. The court explained that the term "order" in the NGWMPA includes orders required by the act, a rule or regulation, or a decision adopted by the board of directors of a natural resources district. However, the letter in question did not meet these criteria, as it was not issued as part of any case or proceeding and was not required by any specific authority. Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

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Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, were involved in a dispute with the Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) over alleged violations of the NRD’s rules and regulations. The NRD claimed the Hauxwells used ground water to irrigate uncertified acres, failed to install flowmeters, and used non-compliant flowmeters. The NRD issued a cease-and-desist order and penalties after a 2020 hearing, where the NRD’s general manager and counsel participated in the board’s deliberations.The Hauxwells challenged the 2020 findings in the district court for Frontier County, which ruled in their favor, citing due process violations and remanded the case. In 2021, the NRD issued a new complaint and held another hearing, excluding the general manager and counsel from deliberations. The board again found violations but deferred penalties to a later hearing. The district court dismissed the Hauxwells' challenge to the 2021 findings, stating it was not a final order as penalties were not yet determined.In 2022, the NRD held a hearing to determine penalties, resulting in restrictions on the Hauxwells' water use. The Hauxwells filed another petition for review, arguing that the 2020 due process violations tainted the subsequent hearings. The district court agreed, reversing the NRD’s 2022 findings and vacating the penalties.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in concluding that the 2020 due process violations tainted the 2021 and 2022 hearings. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case with directions to address the other claims in the Hauxwells' petition for review. The court emphasized that the NRD’s actions in 2021 and 2022 were separate and not influenced by the 2020 hearing’s procedural issues. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

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In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law

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Heartland Co-op, an agricultural cooperative, purchased a property and casualty insurance policy from Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company. The policy included earnings and extra expense coverage with a $3 million limit for "any one loss" at "all covered locations." In August 2020, a derecho caused significant damage to Heartland's operations across 48 locations. Nationwide paid Heartland approximately $131 million for the losses, including $3 million for earnings and extra expense coverage. Heartland claimed that the $3 million limit should apply to each location individually, while Nationwide argued that the limit applied to the total loss across all locations.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted Nationwide's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the policy unambiguously limited the earnings and extra expense coverage to $3 million in total for the derecho-related loss. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the policy language was clear and that the $3 million limit applied to the aggregate loss across all covered locations.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the decisions of the lower courts. The court held that the insurance policy was unambiguous and provided coverage for the total loss of net income and extra expense to Heartland as an entity, not on a per-location basis. The $3 million limit applied to the total loss resulting from the derecho at all covered locations. The court emphasized that the policy's plain language and the premium paid supported this interpretation, and it declined to rewrite the contract to provide the coverage Heartland sought. View "Heartland Co-Op v. Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Petitioners Jason Fabrizius and Fabrizius Livestock LLC sought review of a USDA Judicial Officer's order that denied their appeal of two USDA ALJ orders. The ALJ found Fabrizius Livestock responsible for ensuring animals transported interstate had required documentation and issued a $210,000 fine against the company. Fabrizius Livestock, a Colorado corporation dealing in horses, often sold horses intended for slaughter and kept them in conditions that made them vulnerable to disease. The company sold horses across state lines without the necessary documentation, including ICVIs and EIA test results.The ALJ found Fabrizius liable for violations of the CTESA and AHPA regulations, including transporting horses without owner/shipper certificates and selling horses without ICVIs. The ALJ imposed a $210,000 fine, which included penalties for each violation. Fabrizius appealed to a USDA Judicial Officer, arguing that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague, they were not among the "persons responsible," they lacked adequate notice, the fine was arbitrary and capricious, and the fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The Judicial Officer rejected these arguments and affirmed the ALJ's orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague and provided adequate notice. The court found that the term "persons responsible" reasonably included sellers like Fabrizius. The court also held that the $200,000 fine for the AHPA violations was not arbitrary or capricious, as the Judicial Officer had considered all relevant factors. Finally, the court found that the fine was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment, given the gravity of the violations and the potential harm to the equine industry. The court denied the petition for review. View "Fabrizius v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

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Kerry and Jeanie Cooper entered into a five-year lease agreement with James and Melisa Crouch to lease farmland for pasturing cattle and growing crops. The lease was set to expire in February 2022, but the Crouches terminated it early, citing the Coopers' failure to employ standard best management practices. The Coopers filed a lawsuit for breach of contract, claiming they were not given adequate notice or an opportunity to cure any alleged default as required by the lease.The District Court of Fremont County found that the Crouches breached the lease by failing to provide the required notice and opportunity to cure. The court awarded the Coopers $153,772.05 in damages, which included costs for feed, supplements, trucking, and replacement pasture. The court also reduced the damages by $24,650.35 for the Coopers' failure to mitigate damages by selling leftover hay.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's findings. The court held that the Crouches did not provide the Coopers with a meaningful opportunity to cure the alleged default, as the termination letter did not specify how to remedy the issues. The court also rejected the Crouches' first-to-breach defense, stating that they could not rely on the Coopers' alleged breach to excuse their own failure to provide proper notice.However, the Supreme Court found that the district court had erroneously included the costs of the pasture leases twice in its damages calculation. The court remanded the case with instructions to reduce the damages award by $2,660.60, affirming the decision in all other respects. View "Crouch v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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William and Mary Fulton purchased a 32-acre property in Jericho, Vermont, in August 2021. The property was enrolled in the Agricultural and Managed Forest Land Use Value Appraisal Program (Current Use program) under a forest management plan that generally prohibited tree cutting. Before finalizing the purchase, the Fultons contacted the Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation (FPR) and the Department of Taxes, Division of Property Valuation and Review (PVR) to inquire about converting the property to agricultural use. They were informed that any tree cutting in violation of the plan would lead to disenrollment from the program and tax penalties. Despite this, the Fultons cut trees on the property shortly after purchasing it.The Fultons did not file the required application to continue the property's enrollment in the Current Use program or submit a notice of withdrawal. In September 2021, the county forester received a complaint about the tree cutting and confirmed the violation. FPR issued an adverse-inspection report in December 2021, leading to the property's removal from the Current Use program and tax penalties. The Fultons appealed to the Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, which granted summary judgment in favor of FPR, concluding that the property was still enrolled in the program at the time of the tree cutting and that the Fultons' actions constituted "development" under the program's rules.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The Court held that the property was not automatically disenrolled from the Current Use program when the Fultons failed to submit the required application and fee. Instead, disenrollment occurs only upon the Director of PVR's action. The Court also held that the Fultons' tree cutting did not fall under the statutory exemption for "development" because it was not related to the construction or alteration of a structure for farming, logging, forestry, or conservation purposes. Therefore, the Fultons' tree cutting violated the forest management plan, justifying the property's removal from the Current Use program. View "Fulton v. Department of Forests, Parks, and Recreation" on Justia Law

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JES Farms Partnership sold crops through Indigo Ag's digital platform. In 2021, JES initiated arbitration against Indigo, alleging breach of a marketplace seller agreement and trade rule violations. Indigo counterclaimed, alleging JES breached the agreement and its addenda. JES then sought a federal court's declaratory judgment that Indigo’s counterclaims were not arbitrable and that some addenda were invalid. Indigo moved to compel arbitration based on the agreement's arbitration clause.The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota partially denied Indigo's motion. The court agreed that Indigo’s counterclaims were arbitrable but ruled that the enforceability of the addenda was not arbitrable under the marketplace seller agreement. The court found the arbitration clause "narrow" and concluded that disputes about the addenda's enforceability did not relate to crop transactions. Indigo appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that the arbitration clause in the marketplace seller agreement was broad, covering "any dispute" related to the agreement or transactions under it. The court found that the enforceability of the addenda was indeed a dispute "relating to crop transactions" and thus fell within the scope of the arbitration clause. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and directed it to grant Indigo’s motion to compel arbitration and address the case's status pending arbitration. View "JES Farms Partnership v. Indigo Ag Inc." on Justia Law

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Rodney and Tonda Ross, along with Laura Field, sued Norman Terry Nelson and his corporate entities for trespass and nuisance. Nelson operated an industrial hog-farming operation and installed pipelines beneath a public road to transport treated pig waste to his farmland, which caused odors and fly infestations affecting the Rosses' property. The plaintiffs claimed Nelson did not have permission to install the pipelines and that the resulting conditions constituted a nuisance.The Phillips District Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on the trespass claim, ruling that Nelson needed the landowners' permission to install the pipelines, which he did not have. The court also denied Nelson's motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim, concluding that Nelson was not entitled to the statutory presumption of "good agricultural practice" under Kansas' right-to-farm statutes because his actions violated state law by trespassing on the plaintiffs' land. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiffs for both trespass and nuisance, including punitive damages.The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's rulings. It held that Nelson's installation of the pipelines exceeded the scope of the public highway easement because it was for his private and exclusive use, thus constituting a trespass. The court also agreed that Nelson was not entitled to the right-to-farm statutory protections because his agricultural activities were not "undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and local laws," given the trespass.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. It held that Nelson's use of the public highway easement for private pipelines was outside the easement's scope and constituted a trespass. The court also held that Nelson's agricultural activities did not conform to state law, disqualifying him from the statutory presumption of good agricultural practices and the right-to-farm protections. View "Ross v. Nelson" on Justia Law