Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees were 34 individuals who owned or resided on properties adjacent to a 220-acre farm in York County, owned since 1986 by appellant George Phillips. Phillips operated his own farm, Hilltop Farms, and leased part of the land to appellant Steve Troyer, who raised various crops. Appellants Synagro Central, LLC and Synagro Mid-Atlantic are corporate entities engaged in the business of recycling biosolids for public agencies for land application; they contracted with municipalities to recycle and transport biosolids, which were then used as fertilizer. Over approximately 54 days between March 2006 and April 2009, approximately 11,635 wet tons of biosolids were applied to 14 fields at the farm. The biosolids were spread over the fields’ surface and not immediately tilled or plowed into the soil. Appellees contended that as soon as the biosolids were applied, extremely offensive odors emanated. In July 2008, appellees filed two similar three-count complaints, which were consolidated; they also filed an amended complaint in 2010. In Count I, appellees alleged appellants’ biosolids activities created a private nuisance. Count II alleged negligence by appellants in their duty to properly handle and dispose of the biosolids. Count III alleged appellants’ biosolids activities constituted a trespass on appellees’ land. Appellees sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. In October 2009, after receiving the third notice of violation from the PaDEP, Synagro suspended the use of biosolids at Hilltop Farms, rendering appellees’ request for injunctive relief moot. The last application of biosolids at the farm occurred in April 2009. Appellants moved for summary judgment on the basis that appellees’ nuisance claims were barred by the one-year statute of repose in section 954(a) of the Right To Farm Act (RTFA). The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court or a jury should have determined the applicability of section 954(a), and whether the trial court properly concluded the land application of biosolids as fertilizer is a “normal agricultural operation,” rendering section 954(a) applicable. The Court held that section 954(a) was a statute of repose; its applicability, as determined by statutory interpretation, was a question of law for courts to decide. Further, the trial court properly held biosolids application fell within the RTFA’s definition of “normal agricultural operation,” which barred appellees’ nuisance claims. Accordingly, the Court reversed the portion of the Superior Court’s order that reversed the grant of summary judgment for appellants on the nuisance claims; the remainder of the order was affirmed. View "Gilbert v. Synagro Central" on Justia Law

This case was a putative class action challenging an herb grower’s (Defendant) marketing of its herbs as organic. Defendant sought judgment on the pleadings on federal preemption and primary jurisdiction grounds, arguing that the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 vests the United States Department of Agriculture with exclusive authority to to regulate the labeling and marketing of organic products and both expressly and impliedly preempts state truth-in-advertising requirements. The trial court agreed and entered a judgment for Defendant. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the express preemption provisions in the Organic Food Act did not foreclose state false advertising suits, but such suits were impliedly preempted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state law claim that produce is being intentionally mislabeled as organic is neither expressly nor impliedly preempted. Remanded. View "Quesada v. Herb Thyme Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Between April 23 and June 1, 2008, there were 57 reported cases of salmonellosis. The FDA, federal and state agencies, and food industry began an investigation to determine the source of contamination. On June 3, 2008, the FDA issued a press release alerting consumers that the salmonella outbreak “appears to be linked” to the consumption of “raw red plum, red Roma, or round red tomatoes” and that “the source of the contaminated tomatoes may be limited to a single grower or packer or tomatoes from a specific geographic area.” Later, a spokesman stated the FDA suspected the contaminated tomatoes had been shipped from Florida or Mexico, and red plum, red Roma, and red round tomatoes were “incriminated with the outbreak.” A third press release announced that “fresh tomatoes now available in the domestic market are not associated with the current outbreak.” Although the link between the salmonella outbreak and the their tomatoes was eventually disproved, tomato producers alleged that all or almost all of the value of the perishable tomatoes was destroyed due to a decrease in market demand. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds that the warning of a possible link between the tomatoes and an outbreak did not effect a regulatory taking. View "DiMare Fresh, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved the raisins. One of the California Marketing Act of 1937's (CMA) requirements was that the Secretary of California’s Department of Food and Agriculture, in adopting a marketing order for industry advertising or research, must find that the order “will tend to effectuate the declared purposes and policies of [the CMA].” The trial court: (1) concluded that this requirement could be met only if “the [o]rder was necessary to address adverse economic conditions in the raisin-growing industry that were so severe as to threaten the continued viability of the industry”; (2) invalidated the advertising and research marketing order challenged here because there was insufficient evidence showing such economic conditions; and (3) found, on these same grounds, that the Department improperly exercised the police power in adopting the marketing order. The Court of Appeal found the trial court’s interpretation of this requirement of the CMA, which Karen Ross, the Secretary, appealed, erroneously limited the CMA’s applicability, as to marketing orders for industry advertising or research, only to Great Depression-like economic circumstances. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment, which mooted the cross-appeal of Lion Raisins, Inc., and Lion Farms LLC (formerly Lion Brothers) (the cross-appeal concerns the proper calculation of the assessment refund for the invalidated marketing order), and remand the matter for the trial court to consider the other challenges to the marketing order that the raisin companies raised. View "California v. Raisin Valley Farms" on Justia Law

Silver Bait operates, on 750 acres in Tennessee, housing, growing, and packaging bait worms for sale to retailers. Silver Bait imports baby worms from Europe and feeds and grows them in seven concrete structures, 540 feet long and 50 feet wide, with a 10-foot wide tractor driveway down the center, with worm beds on either side. Durant grows his own corn in to ensure the quality of the feed. Workers send corn silage through a grinder and combine it with peat moss, lime, and water. Silver Bait also makes its own customized bait cups using an injection-molding machine. Believing its employees fell within a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption for agricultural workers, Silver Bait did not pay overtime. In 2010 the Department of Labor issued a report finding Silver Bait’s employees exempt, ordering Silver Bait to pay overtime for one four-week period when the company acted as a wholesaler, importing worms and immediately reselling them to retailers. After obtaining consent forms from other workers, employees filed a private action under 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment in Silver Bait’s favor. Although not a specifically enumerated farming activity, there is little to distinguish Silver Bait from a traditional farm other than the unfamiliarity of worm farming. View "Barks v. Silver Bait LLC" on Justia Law

Following the insolvency of Pierce Elevator, Inc. (PEI), the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated proceedings to determine claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. After PEI voluntarily surrendered its grain warehouse license to the PSC, the PSC took title to all PEI grain in storage in trust for distribution to all valid owners, depositors, or storers of grain pursuant to the Grain Warehouse Act. The PSC then determined valid claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. The appellant and cross-appellants in this case were claimants who challenged the PSC’s classification of their claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and dismissed, holding (1) the PSC correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the fraud claims of the appellant and some cross-appellants and that the appellant and other-cross appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; (2) the PSC erred in finding that some cross-appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; and (3) some cross-appellants did not have standing to challenge the classification of a certain transaction. View "In re Claims Against Pierce Elevator" on Justia Law

California Exposition and State Fairs (Cal Expo), regulated by Food and Agriculture Code 3301, is responsible for organizing the State Fair every July and enters into an agreement every year with the University of California at Davis School of Veterinary Medicine. The School sets up and manages the livestock nursery exhibit where pregnant pigs and other animals are put on display for three weeks to give birth and nurse. Cal Expo provides the land, tent, support infrastructure, and financial compensation, while the School provides the animals, equipment, and staff. Transporting pigs during the last two weeks of their pregnancy causes suffering due to stress and physical discomfort, potentially resulting in an aborted pregnancy. At the fair, the School places the pregnant pigs in farrowing crates, so small that the mother pigs cannot turn around or walk, for the three-week duration of the State Fair. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting a section 526a taxpayer action, premised on the theory that defendants waste taxpayer money and staff time by obtaining, transporting, and exhibiting pregnant pigs. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, agreeing that California’s animal cruelty laws (Pen. Code, 597, 597t.)are not enforceable through a taxpayer action. View "Animal Legal Def.Fund v. CA Exposition & St. Fairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Duarte Nursery, Inc. sold grape rootstock. It challenged mandatory assessments it had to pay to the California Grape Rootstock Improvement Commission to help fund research for pest-resistant and drought-resistant rootstock, arguing this “Commission Law” and the Commission’s operation as an unconstitutional exercise of the state’s police power in violation of plaintiff’s liberty interests and due process rights under the federal and state Constitutions. In this appeal, instead of claiming impairment of its rights to free speech or free association, plaintiff asserted a right to refuse to help fund research that benefitted the industry as a whole. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief and refunds. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, the Commission and the Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture (Secretary). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Duarte Nursery v. Cal. Grape Rootstock Improvement Comm." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a pork producer and two animal welfare organizations who count pork producers among their members, filed suit claiming that the National Pork Board has misappropriated millions of dollars from a fund for pork promotion into which pork producers are required to pay. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. The court concluded that this case involves a concrete and particularized harm caused by an agency’s failure to confer a direct economic benefit on a statutory beneficiary; the court rejected the government’s argument that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and the Pork Act’s, 7 U.S.C. 48019b)(1), provision for administrative review would not offer plaintiffs adequate relief, and therefore they were not required to pursue it. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Humane Society v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

PETA filed suit against the USDA, arguing that the USDA's failure to craft avian-specific animal welfare regulations pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq., violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1). The district court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the USDA’s enforcement decisions are committed by law to its discretion. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that PETA has organizational standing. On the merits, the court concluded that, even if the USDA has adopted an interim policy of non-enforcement pending the adoption of bird-specific regulations, as PETA alleges, nothing in the AWA requires the USDA to apply the general animal welfare standards to birds before it has promulgated more appropriate bird-specific regulations. In this case, the USDA has not failed to take action where, even assuming that the USDA is compelled by law to act, the court has no power to say that it must do so before finalizing its bird-specific regulations, at least in light of PETA’s abandonment of its argument that the USDA “unreasonably delayed” enforcement. Further, the AWA's mandatory licensure requirement is not directed to the USDA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "PETA v. USDA" on Justia Law