Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Following the insolvency of Pierce Elevator, Inc. (PEI), the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated proceedings to determine claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. After PEI voluntarily surrendered its grain warehouse license to the PSC, the PSC took title to all PEI grain in storage in trust for distribution to all valid owners, depositors, or storers of grain pursuant to the Grain Warehouse Act. The PSC then determined valid claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. The appellant and cross-appellants in this case were claimants who challenged the PSC’s classification of their claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and dismissed, holding (1) the PSC correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the fraud claims of the appellant and some cross-appellants and that the appellant and other-cross appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; (2) the PSC erred in finding that some cross-appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; and (3) some cross-appellants did not have standing to challenge the classification of a certain transaction. View "In re Claims Against Pierce Elevator" on Justia Law

California Exposition and State Fairs (Cal Expo), regulated by Food and Agriculture Code 3301, is responsible for organizing the State Fair every July and enters into an agreement every year with the University of California at Davis School of Veterinary Medicine. The School sets up and manages the livestock nursery exhibit where pregnant pigs and other animals are put on display for three weeks to give birth and nurse. Cal Expo provides the land, tent, support infrastructure, and financial compensation, while the School provides the animals, equipment, and staff. Transporting pigs during the last two weeks of their pregnancy causes suffering due to stress and physical discomfort, potentially resulting in an aborted pregnancy. At the fair, the School places the pregnant pigs in farrowing crates, so small that the mother pigs cannot turn around or walk, for the three-week duration of the State Fair. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting a section 526a taxpayer action, premised on the theory that defendants waste taxpayer money and staff time by obtaining, transporting, and exhibiting pregnant pigs. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, agreeing that California’s animal cruelty laws (Pen. Code, 597, 597t.)are not enforceable through a taxpayer action. View "Animal Legal Def.Fund v. CA Exposition & St. Fairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Duarte Nursery, Inc. sold grape rootstock. It challenged mandatory assessments it had to pay to the California Grape Rootstock Improvement Commission to help fund research for pest-resistant and drought-resistant rootstock, arguing this “Commission Law” and the Commission’s operation as an unconstitutional exercise of the state’s police power in violation of plaintiff’s liberty interests and due process rights under the federal and state Constitutions. In this appeal, instead of claiming impairment of its rights to free speech or free association, plaintiff asserted a right to refuse to help fund research that benefitted the industry as a whole. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief and refunds. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, the Commission and the Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture (Secretary). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Duarte Nursery v. Cal. Grape Rootstock Improvement Comm." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a pork producer and two animal welfare organizations who count pork producers among their members, filed suit claiming that the National Pork Board has misappropriated millions of dollars from a fund for pork promotion into which pork producers are required to pay. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing. The court concluded that this case involves a concrete and particularized harm caused by an agency’s failure to confer a direct economic benefit on a statutory beneficiary; the court rejected the government’s argument that plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; and the Pork Act’s, 7 U.S.C. 48019b)(1), provision for administrative review would not offer plaintiffs adequate relief, and therefore they were not required to pursue it. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Humane Society v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

PETA filed suit against the USDA, arguing that the USDA's failure to craft avian-specific animal welfare regulations pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq., violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1). The district court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the USDA’s enforcement decisions are committed by law to its discretion. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that PETA has organizational standing. On the merits, the court concluded that, even if the USDA has adopted an interim policy of non-enforcement pending the adoption of bird-specific regulations, as PETA alleges, nothing in the AWA requires the USDA to apply the general animal welfare standards to birds before it has promulgated more appropriate bird-specific regulations. In this case, the USDA has not failed to take action where, even assuming that the USDA is compelled by law to act, the court has no power to say that it must do so before finalizing its bird-specific regulations, at least in light of PETA’s abandonment of its argument that the USDA “unreasonably delayed” enforcement. Further, the AWA's mandatory licensure requirement is not directed to the USDA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "PETA v. USDA" on Justia Law

The court certified to the Washington Supreme Court the two questions: (1) Does the Washington Farm Labor Contractor Act, in particular Washington Revised Code 19.30.010(2), include in the definition of a “farm labor contractor” an entity who is paid a per-acre fee to manage all aspects of farming - including hiring and employing agricultural workers as well as making all planting and harvesting decisions, subject to approval - for a particular plot of land owned by a third party? and (2) Does the FLCA, in particular Washington Revised Code 19.30.200, make jointly and severally liable any person who uses the services of an unlicensed farm labor contractor without either inspecting the license issued by the director of the Department of Labor & Industries to the farm labor contractor or obtaining a representation from the director of the Department of Labor & Industries that the contractor is properly licensed, even if that person lacked knowledge that the farm labor contractor was unlicensed? View "Saucedo v. Farmland Mgmt. Serv." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law

Howes, the owner of a pickling cucumber farm, was found to be in violation of provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determinations that: Howes’ cucumber harvesters were employees, and not independent contractors, such that the FLSA protections apply; Howes controlled the facilities used to house the migrant farm workers in 2011, and was liable for violations of the MSPA in regard to the provision of substandard housing; and Howes unlawfully interfered with the Department of Labor investigation. View "Perez v. D. Howes, LLC" on Justia Law

The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate orders to maintain stable markets for agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee, which requires that growers set aside a percentage of their crop, free of charge. The government sells the reserve raisins in noncompetitive markets, donates them, or disposes of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting administration expenses, the net proceeds are distributed back to the growers. In 2002–2003, growers were required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop; in 2003–2004, 30 percent. The Hornes refused to set aside any raisins on the ground that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The government fined them the fair market value of the raisins, with additional civil penalties. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement was not a Fifth Amendment taking. The Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. The reserve requirement is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred. Any net proceeds the growers receive from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation, but does not mean the raisins have not been taken. This taking cannot be characterized as part of a voluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. The ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, while subject to reasonable government regulation, is not a “benefit” that the government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. The Court noted that just compensation can be measured by the market value the government already calculated when it fined the Hornes. View "Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In 2009, 2010, and 2011, the Dowling Family Partnership and Dowling Brothers Partnership (collectively, the Partnerships) entered into a series of cash farm leases with Midland Farms, LLC. The 2012 crop year lease created a right of first refusal held by the Partnerships regarding the 2013, 2014, and 2015 crop years, a right that ripened into an option when Midland received an offer from Clement Farms and relayed the new price to the Partnerships. In 2012, Midland sought a legal determination that the parties had not extended the prior lease. The circuit court concluded that an enforceable contract existed between the Partnerships and Midland, and the Partnerships exercised their right to lease the property for the 2013 through 2015 crop years. The Partnerships were subsequently restored to possession of the leased property. The Partnerships sued Midland a second time seeking damages for being denied possession of the property from August 2012 to March 2013. Midland sought restitution from the Partnerships for the amount it paid to Clement as reimbursement for Clement’s planting expenses. The circuit court concluded that the Partnerships did not suffer damage, Midland was not entitled to restitution, and Midland had unclean hands. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that Midland breached its lease with the Partnerships and that the Partnerships were not unjustly enriched. View "Dowling Family P’ship v. Midland Farms, LLC" on Justia Law