Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Mike McGarland and Contender Farms challenge a USDA regulation promulgated under the Horse Protection Act (HPA), 15 U.S.C. 1821-31, requiring that private entities, known as Horse Industry Organizations (HIOs), impose mandatory suspensions on those participants found to engage in a practice known as "soring." The court affirmed the district court's holding as to justiciability where plaintiffs, regular participants in the Tennessee walking horse industry, have standing to challenge the Regulation and present a ripe challenge to it. On the merits, the court held that the district court erred in concluding that the Regulation is a valid application of USDA regulatory authority under the HPA. Accordingly, the court reversed and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the USDA. The court remanded for entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs. View "Contender Farms v. USDA" on Justia Law

Maurice McGinnis sought a loan through federal farm credit programs and alleges that he was denied access to such programs by the Department because of his race. This appeal concerns McGinnis' participation in a claims process established by a class action settlement agreement to resolve his and other farmers' discrimination claims. The court concluded that Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree empowers the District Court to correct an error by the facilitator in transmitting a claim to the wrong track. If it is true that McGinnis selected Track B and the facilitator nevertheless sent his claim package to the adjudicator, the district court did no more than enforce the parties' agreement. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that it could review the facilitator's claim processing and vacate the adjudicator's determination. The court concluded that McGinnis' request to change his claim to Track B was sufficiently close in time to his submission of the claim package, and the language of the Consent Decree defining what constitutes a "completed claim package" is sufficiently ambiguous, to justify the district court in granting his petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pigford v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

The USDA, owner of the patents on the table grape varieties Scarlet Royal and Autumn King, has exclusively licensed the patents to the California Table Grape Commission, which sublicenses to California grape growers and collects royalties that are shared by the Commission and the USDA. The licensing agreements require the growers to pay a royalty on grapes produced and prohibit the growers from propagating the plants. Growers who purchased grapevines covered by the patents, signed license agreements, and paid the fee, challenged the validity and enforceability of the patents, and the conduct of the Commission and the USDA in licensing and enforcing the patents. They argued that the grape varieties were in public use more than one year before the applications for both patents were filed, and that the patents are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 102(b). After the Federal Circuit held that the Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immunity for purposes of such an action against the USDA, the district court held that the actions of two individuals who obtained samples of the plants in an unauthorized manner and planted them in their own fields did not constitute an invalidating public use of the plant varieties. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Delano Farms Co. v. Cal. Table Grape Comm'n" on Justia Law

Fred and Tina Preisler operated a dairy farm and raised cattle. The Preislers hired Kuettel’s Septic to apply septage, which is primarily composed of human urine and fecal material, to their farm fields. The Preislers subsequently experienced problems with their well water. The Preislers sued Kuettel’s Septic, other defendants, and their insurers, alleging, among other claims, negligence in storing and in applying septage resulting in nuisance and trespass. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the insurers, concluding that a pollution exclusion clause precluded coverage for harm resulting from the Preislers’ water supply’s contamination. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “a reasonable insured would understand that decomposing septage is a ‘contaminant’ and therefore a ‘pollutant’ as defined in the policies when it has decomposed and seeps into a water supply.” View "Preisler v. Kuettel's Septic Serv., LLC" on Justia Law

In 2011, Robert and Jane Falk spread liquid cow manure onto their farm fields for the purpose of fertilization. The manure leeched into and contaminated the wells of the Falks’ neighbors. Wilson Mutual Insurance Company, the Falks’ insurer, filed a declaratory judgment motion claiming it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the Falks against allegations that they negligently spread manure on their property and thereby polluted their neighbors’ wells. The circuit court granted the motion, concluding that the Wilson Mutual policy issued to the Falks contained an exclusion for pollution and that manure is unambiguously a pollutant. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that manure is not a pollutant because, to a reasonable farmer, manure is “liquid gold.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the pollution exclusion in the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for well contamination caused by the seepage of cow manure. View "Wilson Mut. Ins. Co. v. Falk" on Justia Law

This long-running dispute over Puerto Rico’s dairy industry resulted in the principal parties settling. Pursuant to the settlement, the Department of Agriculture for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and others (collectively, the "Department") agreed to promulgate a regulation that would significantly rework the pricing and structure of the dairy market. Intervenors Industria Lechera de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Indulac") and the Puerto Rico Dairy Farmers Association, who were excluded from the bargaining table, objected to the settlement, alleging that the regulation violated Puerto Rico’s constitutional and statutory law. The district court approved the settlement agreement. Indulac appealed. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear Indulac’s appeal because it was untimely. View "Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Industria Lechera de P.R., Inc." on Justia Law

The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) grants grazing permits to private individuals who own land adjacent to public lands; adjacent, private lands are called "base properties." Grazing permits limit both the number of animals grazing on a specific allotment of public land and the number of days they are permitted to graze. Appellant Stanley Jones appealed his convictions for one count of unlawful use or occupation of public lands, and two counts of allowing his livestock to graze without authorization on public lands. While Mr. Jones owned cattle in Wyoming, he was not the owner of the base properties adjacent to the two BLM public lands or allotments involved in this suit. Instead, his brother owned the adjacent base properties During the periods at issue, no grazing permit had been issued to Mr. Jones or his brother, nor has Mr. Jones leased his brother's property, as required for obtaining such a permit. After issuing Mr. Jones multiple administrative trespass notices and fines over the years for grazing his cattle on these and other allotments without a permit, the BLM, through the United States Attorney's Office for Wyoming, brought criminal charges against him, including one count of unlawful use or occupation, and for unauthorized grazing. A jury convicted Mr. Jones of all three criminal counts, and thereafter, the district court sentenced him to two years of supervised probation for each count, to be served concurrently, together with a $3,000 fine, contingent on his compliance with certain terms and conditions, and a $75 special assessment. Appearing pro se, Mr. Jones appealed, arguing that "the handling of the district court proceeding caused the jury to come to the wrong conclusion and that the true and honest facts should have been considered." Furthermore, Mr. Jones argued: (1) the district court improperly granted the government's motion in limine and excluded his witness from testifying, thereby depriving him of a fair trial; and (2) the proceedings against him were fundamentally unfair and denied him due process for a multitude of reasons. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

A Chester, Illinois grain bin exploded, injuring three workers. A jury awarded almost $180 million in compensatory and punitive damages against ConAgra, which owned the facility, part of a flour mill, and West Side, which ConAgra had hired about a month before the explosion to address problems in the bin. The injured workers were working on the bin’s problems. On appeal, West Side did not contest liability to the workers but claimed that it did not have to reimburse ConAgra for the cost of repairing the facility. Both maintained that damages were excessive. The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment against ConAgra and the award of punitive damages against West Side, but affirmed awards of compensatory damages against West Side and remanded for consideration of indemnification and contribution. West Side was an independent contractor in a commercial relation with ConAgra and normal rules of contract and tort law apply. Having hired an expert in hot bins, ConAgra was entitled to assume that West Side would ask for whatever information it needed. Admission of evidence that referred to insurance was harmless; the verdicts so far exceeded $3 million that the jury’s belief that West Side carried that much insurance cannot have played a material role. View "Jentz v. Conagra Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

The prior owner of the 300-acre STEW Farm in Pickaway County contracted with Watershed Management for construction of waterways and received a subsidy from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), a USDA agency, 7 U.S.C. 6962. Kohli, an employee of the Pickaway County Soil and Water Conservation District supervised by NRCS, designed the waterways, and, after certified that they were designed and constructed properly. NRCS also certified the waterways, which allowed the owner to receive the federal reimbursement. The owner failed to pay Watershed, claiming that there was a ridge at the edge of the grass waterways that prevented proper draining. In 2009, Watershed sued for breach of contract; the owner counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of warranty. A state court granted summary judgment against the owner for failure to prove damages. The new owner then filed a federal suit. The district court dismissed, reasoning, as to NRCS, that STEW Farm had not identified a separate source of federal substantive law and failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity because there are no “clear guidelines” which show that the NRCS actions were not committed to agency discretion. As to Watershed, the court concluded that there was no federal cause of action nor did the state claims implicate significant federal issues. As to PCSWCD, STEW Farm alleged only state-law claims that did not implicate significant federal issues. As to PCSWCD and Kohli, the claims were time barred under Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Stew Farm, Ltd. v. Natural Res. Conservation Serv." on Justia Law

Between 2009 and 2012, Sunshine and Purdy, a Kentucky dairy farmer, entered into “Dairy Cow Leases.” Purdy received 435 cows to milk, and, in exchange, paid monthly rent to Sunshine. Purdy’s business faltered in 2012, and he sought bankruptcy protection. Sunshine moved to retake possession of the cattle. Citizens First Bank had a perfected purchase money security interest in Purdy’s equipment, farm products, and livestock, and claimed that its perfected security interest gave Citizens First priority over Sunshine with regard to the cattle. Citizens argued that the “leases” were disguised security agreements, that Purdy actually owned the cattle, and that the subsequently-acquired livestock were covered by the bank’s security interest. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Citizens, finding that the leases were per se security agreements. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the terms of the agreements expressly preserve Sunshine’s ability to recover the cattle. Whether the parties strictly adhered to the terms of these leases is irrelevant to determining whether the agreements were true leases or disguised security agreements. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the parties sufficiently explained the legal import of Purdy’s culling practices or put forward any evidence that the parties altered the terms of the leases making them anything but leases. View "In re: Purdy" on Justia Law