Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

The prior owner of the 300-acre STEW Farm in Pickaway County contracted with Watershed Management for construction of waterways and received a subsidy from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS), a USDA agency, 7 U.S.C. 6962. Kohli, an employee of the Pickaway County Soil and Water Conservation District supervised by NRCS, designed the waterways, and, after certified that they were designed and constructed properly. NRCS also certified the waterways, which allowed the owner to receive the federal reimbursement. The owner failed to pay Watershed, claiming that there was a ridge at the edge of the grass waterways that prevented proper draining. In 2009, Watershed sued for breach of contract; the owner counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of warranty. A state court granted summary judgment against the owner for failure to prove damages. The new owner then filed a federal suit. The district court dismissed, reasoning, as to NRCS, that STEW Farm had not identified a separate source of federal substantive law and failed to establish a waiver of sovereign immunity because there are no “clear guidelines” which show that the NRCS actions were not committed to agency discretion. As to Watershed, the court concluded that there was no federal cause of action nor did the state claims implicate significant federal issues. As to PCSWCD, STEW Farm alleged only state-law claims that did not implicate significant federal issues. As to PCSWCD and Kohli, the claims were time barred under Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Stew Farm, Ltd. v. Natural Res. Conservation Serv." on Justia Law

Between 2009 and 2012, Sunshine and Purdy, a Kentucky dairy farmer, entered into “Dairy Cow Leases.” Purdy received 435 cows to milk, and, in exchange, paid monthly rent to Sunshine. Purdy’s business faltered in 2012, and he sought bankruptcy protection. Sunshine moved to retake possession of the cattle. Citizens First Bank had a perfected purchase money security interest in Purdy’s equipment, farm products, and livestock, and claimed that its perfected security interest gave Citizens First priority over Sunshine with regard to the cattle. Citizens argued that the “leases” were disguised security agreements, that Purdy actually owned the cattle, and that the subsequently-acquired livestock were covered by the bank’s security interest. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of Citizens, finding that the leases were per se security agreements. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the terms of the agreements expressly preserve Sunshine’s ability to recover the cattle. Whether the parties strictly adhered to the terms of these leases is irrelevant to determining whether the agreements were true leases or disguised security agreements. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the parties sufficiently explained the legal import of Purdy’s culling practices or put forward any evidence that the parties altered the terms of the leases making them anything but leases. View "In re: Purdy" on Justia Law

Syngenta, producer of a genetically-modified corn seed, filed suit against Bunge, an agricultural produce storage and transport company, alleging breach of an obligation under the United States Warehouse Act (USWA), 7 U.S.C. 241-256; breach of a duty to third party beneficiaries of a licensing agreement between Bunge and the federal government; and false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125. The court concluded that the text of the USWA and the structure of the Act do not implicitly authorize a private cause of action for violations of a warehouse operator's fair treatment obligations; Syngenta is not a third-party beneficiary of the License Agreement and the district court did not err in dismissing this claim on the pleadings; and the court found it was necessary to remand the Lanham Act claim, in light of Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., for the district court to determine in the first instance whether Syngenta has standing to bring the claim under the zone-of-interests test and proximate causality requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the USWA and third-party beneficiary claims, and vacated the grant of summary judgment to Bunge on the Lanham Act claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Bunge North America, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1980, the Montana Board of Livestock (Board) adopted the 12-Day Rule, which prohibits the sale of milk in Montana more than twelve days after pasteurization. In 2008, Core-Mark International, Inc. filed a petition with the Board seeking to amend or repeal the 12-day Rule. The Board held an administrative proceeding regarding Core-Mark’s petition, part of which involved a formal evidentiary hearing conducted by an independent hearing examiner. The hearing examiner issued a proposed decision recommending that the Board consider repealing the 12-day Rule. However, the Board voted unanimously to retain the 12-day Rule without modification. The district court denied Core-Mark’s petition for judicial review. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in concluding that the administrative proceeding was not a contested case proceeding and therefore not subject to judicial review; (2) by applying the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and in determining that the Board’s decision did not violate that standard; and (3) in concluding that the 12-day Rule is a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. View "Core-Mark Int’l, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Livestock" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs contend that the FDA is required by 21 U.S.C. 360b(e)(1) to proceed with hearings to determine whether to withdraw approval for the use of penicillin and tetracyclines in animal feed, and that the FDA's denial of two citizen petitions demanding such hearings was arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 706(2). Based on the court's survey of the text, the context, the regulations, and the background legal principles, the court concluded that Congress has not required the FDA to hold hearings whenever FDA officials have scientific concerns about the safety of animal drug usage, that the FDA retains the discretion to institute or terminate proceedings to withdraw approval of animal drugs by issuing or withdrawing notices of opportunity for hearing (NOOHs), and that the statutory mandate contained in section 360b(e)(1) applies to limit the FDA's remedial discretion by requiring withdrawal of approval of animal drugs or particular uses of such drugs only when the FDA has made a final determination, after notice and hearing, that the drug could pose a threat to human health and safety. The court also concluded that it is not arbitrary or capricious for the FDA to pursue policies intended to reduce the use of animal feed containing antibiotics through a variety of steps short of withdrawing approval for the use of antibiotics in feed via a protracted administrative process and likely litigation. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's judgment to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. View "NRDC v. US FDA" on Justia Law

This case concerned a request for certain public records for specific nutrient management plans (NMP) of various private farming operations. Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. (WKA) submitted the requests, without success, to the Maryland Department of Agriculture (MDA) pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act (PIA). Other parties became involved in the ensuing litigation, including the Maryland Farm Bureau, Inc. (MFB). In 2009, the circuit court issued an order (2009 Order) in which it granted the MDA’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied MFB’s motion for summary judgment. No further litigation activity was reflected on the docket. In 2010, the MDA received another PIA request regarding specific NMP information, this time from a co-plaintiff in the WKA action. In the resulting litigation, the circuit court issued an order (2011 Order) granting MFB’s motion for clarification and declaring how the 2010 PIA request was controlled by the 2009 decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the 2011 Order, like the 2009 Order, was not a final judgment, as it did not resolve all the claims before the trial court, and none of the immediate appealability exceptions to the requirement of a final judgment were applicable. View "Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agriculture" on Justia Law

In 1952 an Illinois owner granted a pipeline operator an easement for two pipelines across the parcel. The first was built immediately; the second, if built, had to be within 10 feet of the first. The contract says that any pipeline must be “buried to such depth as will not interfere with such cultivation.” In 2012 the operator notified the owner that it planned to build a second pipeline. The owner filed a quiet-title suit, alleging that either the right to build a second line had expired or that another line would violate the farmability condition. The operator replied that 49 U.S.C. 60104(c), preempts enforcement of the farmability condition. The district court dismissed. A second pipeline has been built 50 feet from the first, using eminent domain to obtain the necessary rights, but the owner anticipates construction of a third pipeline. Vacating the judgment, the Seventh Circuit held that no construction is currently planned and the district court acted prematurely. Until details of a third pipeline’ are known, it is not possible to determine what effect it would have on agricultural use. Only if a third pipeline prevents using the land for agriculture would it be necessary (or prudent) to determine whether section 60104(c) establishes a federal right to destroy more of the land’s value than paid for in 1952. The court stated that it had no reason to think that Illinois would call the 1952 contract an option or apply the Rule Against Perpetuities. View "Knight v. Enbridge Pipelines, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Prime Time filed suit contending that USDA's method of calculating assessments for cigars violated the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act (FETRA), 7 U.S.C. 518d. Applying Chevron deference, the court concluded that USDA's decision to read the word "volume" in subsection (e) as Congress used it in subsection (e) is entirely reasonable and fully implements subsection (e)'s "pro rata basis" requirement; nor is USDA's interpretation of the statutory term "share of gross domestic volume" "internally inconsistent"; although subsection (e) may have little independent operative effect, USDA's interpretation of subsection (e) as setting forth a general requirement was perfectly reasonable; and the court rejected Prime Time's argument that its interpretation gives more effect to subsection (e)'s pro rata basis limitation than does USDA's. Accordingly, the court concluded that USDA's approach represented a reasonable interpretation of the Act. View "Prime Time Int'l Co. v. AGRI, et al." on Justia Law

Monsanto developed a genetic modification in soybean seeds (Roundup Ready® (RR)), known as the 40-3-2 event (RR trait), which enables soybean plants to tolerate application of glyphosate herbicide to kill weeds. Monsanto owns the patent for the RR trait and granted Pioneer a license to produce and sell seeds containing the traits. After Pioneer became a subsidiary of DuPont, Monsanto and Pioneer entered into an amended license, under which DuPont produced and sold RR trait seed. In 2006, DuPont announced that it had developed a glyphosate-tolerant trait, OGAT, expected to confer tolerance to both glyphosate and acetolactate synthase inhibitor herbicide. Testing indicated that OGAT alone did not provide sufficient glyphosate-tolerance for commercial use. DuPont then combined OGAT with the RR trait; the OGAT/RR stack provided increased yields in field trials. DuPont did not sell any OGAT/RR product, however, and discontinued development. Monsanto sued DuPont for breach of the license and patent infringement. The district court granted partial judgment to Monsanto, holding that the license was unambiguous and did not grant the right to stack non-RR technologies with the licensed” trait, but allowed DuPont to amend its answer to assert reformation counterclaims and defenses. The court ultimately told DuPont to “either voluntarily dismiss these reformation claims or produce … all documents … previously withheld.” DuPont continued litigating its reformation counterclaims and produced previously withheld internal e-mails that showed its awareness that it did not have the right to commercialize the OGAT/RR stack. The court found that DuPont’s position was not rooted in fact, that DuPont made misrepresentations and had perpetrated a fraud on the court, struck DuPont’s reformation defense and counterclaims, and awarded limited attorney fees to Monsanto. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Monsanto Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Farm Credit had a security interest in corn delivered to Cargill and filed suit against Cargill in replevin for the corn. The district court concluded that Farm Credit's security interest under the Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985, 7 U.S.C. 1631(e), entitled it to proceeds from the corn delivered to Cargill. The court concluded that Cargill did not dispute that Farm Credit complied with the FSA. To the extent that the U.C.C. governs priority disputes as a foundation for the FSA, Cargill's argument failed because U.C.C. 9-404 does not apply in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Farm Credit. View "Farm Credit Serv. v. Cargill, Inc." on Justia Law