Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff’s patent discloses an “easy clean dual wall deck” for a rotary cutter. Defendants manufacture rotary cutters that are pulled behind a tractor and used to mow wide swaths of ground. The accused rotary cutters can “rough cut” fields after a harvest or clear weeds and brush along roadsides. Plaintiff’s patent addresses a problem encountered by rotary cutters. Prior art cutters had structural components such as gearboxes and deck bracings mounted either on top of or underneath the cutter deck; the patent discloses a dual-wall deck that encloses the structural components in a torsionally-strong box, leaving smooth surfaces on the top and bottom of the deck for easing cleaning. The district court entered summary judgment of noninfringement. The Federal Circuit vacated, affirming the construction of “rotary cutter deck” and the determination that the terms “substantially planar” and “easily washed off” do not render the asserted claims invalid under 35 U.S.C. 112, but holding that the district court erroneously construed the term “into engagement with” to require direct contact. View "Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Rosenwinkels purchased 160 acres in Kendall County in 1991 and began cattle operations in 1992. Across the road was a farm house, at least 100 years old; in 1991, the tenant moved out and the house was vacant. In 1998, the Toftoys demolished the house. They built a new home, completed in 2004. In 2007, they filed a nuisance action complaining about flies. The Rosenwinkels sought protection under the Farm Nuisance Suit Act (740 ILCS 70/1). The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the Toftoys and ordered remedial measures, including removal of moist bedding and manure. The appellate court affirmed, except as to the remedy. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that plaintiffs did not acquire property rights until six years after the farm began operating, beyond the Act’s one-year limitation. By “coming to the nuisance,” plaintiffs were barred from suit. The Act is a “right-to-farm” law to limit nuisance actions and preserve use of farmland. It provides that no farm “shall be or become a private or public nuisance because of any changed conditions in the surrounding area” when the farm has been in existence for one year and was not a nuisance when it began operations. View "Toftoy et al., etc., v. Rosenwinkel et al." on Justia Law

Dawson Farms challenged the RMA's denial of its crop-insurance claim alleging loss due to "tuber rot" in stored potatoes. A final agency review affirmed the RMA's denial of Dawson Farms' claim, finding that the insurance adjuster's sampling of the stored potatoes followed adequate sample procedures. Dawson Farms appealed the final agency decision to the district court, which affirmed. The court believed that, in light of the nature of the hearing officer's finding under review, the deputy director's statements made it reasonably discernable that the deputy director applied the correct legal standard and considered the record for the proper purpose of reviewing the hearing officer's decision for substantial evidence. The hearing officer based his conclusion largely on the testimony of an expert in potato pathology. The court also believed that, to the extent the deputy director's determination was a rejection of the hearing officer's finding that the adjuster had a duty to resample, the issue under review was a question of law. Consequently, the court found no abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious action by the deputy director. Further, the agency determination was supported by substantial evidence. View "Dawson Farms v. Risk Management Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns properties in a mixed rural/suburban area in central Illinois and lives in a house on one parcel. The other parcels, about 190 acres and near the house, were zoned agricultural and very close to a hog farm. The owners of two other properties in proximity to the hog farm obtained rezoning to the “rural residential” classification, but the county declined plaintiff’s applications for rezoning. Plaintiff sued in state court; the court entered an “Agreed Order” that stated that the parcels should be rezoned, but did not order that they be rezoned. One year later, the zoning board held the required hearing and recommended approval. The County Board voted 11 to 10 in favor of the applications, less than a three-fourths majority, which functioned as a denial. In 2008, the Board granted the applications, but the real estate market had collapsed, and the parcels were no longer worth more zoned residential than they had been when zoned agricultural. Plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that protection of agriculture was a rational, nonretaliatory motive for voting against the applications. View "Guth v. Tazewell County" on Justia Law

These proceedings involved a complex, rarely litigated federal statute, the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), 7 U.S.C. 499a et seq., designed in part to assure that farmers were paid for their produce. In 2009, a Judicial Officer (JO) of the USDA determined that petitioners had violated the PACA by failing to make prompt payment for produce purchases. The court held that the JO's determination that the Subsidiaries purchased produce and failed to make prompt payment for it as required by section 499b(4) was supported by substantial evidence; the JO's conclusion that Petitioners Duncan and Bennett were responsibly connected to Consolidation and Farms under section 499a(b)(9) was also supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error; and therefore, the petitions for review were rejected. View "Perfectly Fresh Farms, Inc., et al. v. USDA; Bennett v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, cattle producers, appealed the district court's dismissal of their Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b)(1), complaint, alleging that a government employee negligently caused illness and death within their cattle herd by mandating a toxic plant mixture on pasture land enrolled in a conservation program. The district court held that the allegations of negligence involved the employee's exercise of protected discretion and therefore fell within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The court held that the employee's selection of a seeding plan was discretionary but that it was not the type of discretionary action Congress intended to shield from suit. View "Herden, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The Scotts Company, an Ohio LLC, brought a diversity action against Seeds, Inc., a Washington corporation, in federal district court. Thereafter, Millhorn Farmers, Maple Leaf Farms, Mica Creek, and Tim Freeburg (Growers) sued Seeds and Scotts in Washington state court. Maple Leaf Farms and Mica Creek were Washington corporations, Millhorn Farms was an Idaho corporation, and Tim Freeburg was a citizen of Idaho. Scotts subsequently filed an amended complaint in federal court adding the Growers as defendants and seeking declaratory relief. The district court subsequently realigned the Growers and plaintiffs and Seeds and Scotts as defendants and held, alternatively, that it would stay the federal proceedings in favor of the related state court proceedings under either the Brillhart doctrine or the Colorado River doctrine. Because the parties' realignment resulted in the absence of complete diversity of citizenship between defendant Seeds and newly-aligned plaintiffs-Growers, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court should not have declined to entertain the claim for declaratory relief under the Brillhart doctrine, and instead, the claims should have been evaluated under the Colorado River doctrine. Remanded. View "Scotts Co., LLC v. Seeds, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal were two issues: (1) whether the judicially created "filed rate doctrine," which typically has been utilized in common carrier and public utility litigation, was applicable in a class action lawsuit seeking monetary and injunctive relief under state law arising from the misreporting of pricing data to the USDA, where the data in turn were used to set a minimum price structure for raw milk sales; and (2) if the doctrine was applicable in that situation, whether the district court erred when it dismissed Plaintiffs' state causes of action on the ground that the filed rate doctrine barred such claims, even though the court found that it was not disputed that the USDA determined that the rates calculated were erroneous and that other rates should have applied based on correct pricing inputs. The plaintiffs here were dairy farmers who sold raw milk that was priced according to the erroneous reports. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the district court properly determined that the filed rate doctrine applied to the minimum milk pricing program, but erred by concluding that the doctrine applied to bar the plaintiffs' state-law claims in this case. View "Carlin v. DairyAmerica, Inc." on Justia Law

Whoever “invents or discovers and asexually re-produces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor,” 35 U.S.C. 161. In 1980, Beineke noticed two white oak trees with superior genetic traits, such as excellent timber quality and strong central stem tendency. The trees were in the yard of another and about 105-118 years old. Beineke planted acorns from each. An examiner rejected patent applications because Beineke did not provide evidence that the trees were in a cultivated state. The Board affirmed, finding that the land on which the trees grew had existed as a wooded pasture until a house was constructed around 1930, after the trees began growing; there was no evidence that human activity contributed to the creation of the trees. The Federal Circuit affirmed, without addressing cultivation. Congress recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.” The trees were not “newly found seedlings,” and do not fall within the broadened protection of the 1954 amendments. View "In re Beineke" on Justia Law

The Johnsons, organic farmers, claimed that while Appellant, a cooperative, was spraying pesticide onto conventionally farmed fields adjacent to the Johnsons' fields, some pesticide contaminated the Johnsons' organic fields. The Johnsons sued Appellant on theories including trespass, nuisance, and negligence per se, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court granted summary judgment to Appellant and dismissed all of the Johnsons' claims. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that the Johnsons' trespass claim and claim for damages based on 7 C.F.R. 205.202(b) failed as a matter of law, and therefore, reversed the court of appeals' reinstatement of those claims; and (2) held that the district court failed to consider whether the Johnsons' non trespass claims that were not based on section 205.202(b) could survive summary judgment, and therefore, affirmed the court of appeals' reinstatement of those claims. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co." on Justia Law