Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Taxpayer, related corporations that operated a vertically-integrated poultry production business, sought an exemption from ad valorem taxes on five industrial personal property tax returns it filed with the State Tax Department, claiming it was exempt from such taxation under either the "subsistence of livestock" or the "farm" exemption under W. Va. Code 11-3-9-(a)(21), (28). The State Tax Commissioner concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to either exemption. The trial court (1) ruled that Taxpayer was entitled to claim the "subsistence of livestock" exemption in connection with its hatchery operation but not with regard to personal property used at its live haul center and feed mill operation; and (2) concluded that none of Taxpayer's operation qualified for the "farm" exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in ruling that Taxpayer was not entitled to any exemptions from personal property taxation in connection with its commercial poultry operation other than the exemption afforded to its hatchery operation. View "Pilgrim's Pride v. Morris" on Justia Law

Jensen Family Farms, Inc. ("Jensen") sued the Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District ("District"), alleging that the District's Rules 220, 310, and 1010 were preempted by the federal Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; Rules 220 and 310 violated certain provisions of California law; and the Rules violated Jensen's due process rights. Jensen moved for summary judgment and while it's motion was pending, the district court granted the California Air Resources Board's ("CARB"), California's air pollution control agency, motion to intervene. CARB and the District (collectively, "defendants") subsequently filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Jensen appealed the district court's judgment. The principal question in this case, among other questions, was whether the District's rules were preempted by the CAA. The court held that Rules 220 and 310 were not standards or other requirements related to the control of emissions and therefore, not preempted by CAA 209(e). The court also held that Rule 1010 did not apply to any "nonroad engines," as that term was used in the CAA and therefore, was not preempted under section 209(e). The court further held that there was no basis for Jensen's claim under Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 93116 or Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13, 2450 et. seq.; that the Rules did not violate Jenson's due process rights where it admitted that the Rules served the legitimate government interest in minimizing air pollution from diesel engines; and the Rules did not violate California Constitution, Article 13A because Jensen waived this argument in its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants.View "Jensen Family Farms, Inc. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control District, et al." on Justia Law

Several Nebraska farmers filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging their due process rights were violated when Nebraska officials ordered the farmers to cease drawing water from the Niobrara Watershed without providing a predeprivation hearing. The court agreed with the district court that the farmers have not suffered a deprivation of their property rights where the property right held by the farmers was expressly conditioned on the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources' (DNR) determination of watershed capacity. Therefore, the farmers had no legitimate claim to the water when the DNR determined that there was a scarcity and the issuance of Closing Notices was necessary to satisfy the needs of senior appropriators. The court also held that the district court was permitted to dismiss without prejudice the pendent state-law ultra vires claim in light of its grant of summary judgment on the section 1983 claim. View "Keating, et al. v. Nebraska Public Power District, et al." on Justia Law

A default judgment entered against the defendant, for failure to pay loans from the Department of Agriculture. On the day before property was to be sold at auction, the defendant filed a bankruptcy petition. The judge lifted the stay. The $322,000 proceeds from the sale were inadequate to pay the debt and the government has a deficiency judgment. The trial court denied a motion to set aside the sale and a request for an opportunity to redeem. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although the property has transferred to the buyers, who are not parties to the litigation, and their interests are secure, the case is not moot. The sale price, which was below the $513,000 appraisal price, did not "shock the conscience" so as to be invalid under Wisconsin law.View "United States v. Buchman" on Justia Law

Migrant workers who worked for defendant appealed a summary judgment in favor of defendant and against their complaint that defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 203(m). At issue was whether an employer that hired migrant farm workers through the H-2A visa program was entitled to wage credits under the Act for housing and meals that federal law required the employer to provide the workers. The court deferred to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation that defendant could not credit the cost of housing in the wages paid to the workers and agreed with defendant that it was entitled to wage credits for the costs of meals for the workers. The court also concluded that defendant was not liable under principles of agency law for the fees that third parties charged the workers related to their efforts to obtain employment with defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View " Ramos-Barrientos, et al. v. Bland, et al." on Justia Law

A family partnership purchased 749-acres for use as a farm. The entire farm enjoyed current-agricultural-use-valuation (CAUV) status until a seventy-acre parcel was transferred to Maralgate, LLC, after which the county auditor denied the CAUV application. Maralgate filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision, which also denied the application. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed and granted CAUV status. At issue on appeal was whether the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.30(A)(1) because almost sixty percent of the parcel had trees that were not grown for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm because the family partnership owned Maralgate; (2) the statute does not require that the trees in question be grown as a crop; and (3) a land survey showing how much of the parcel is devoted to different uses is required only if there is a commercial use of part of a parcel that is not an agricultural use, and, in this instance, those portions of the parcel not actively cultivated were not used for any commercial purpose. View "Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene County Bd. of Revision " on Justia Law

A 1935 settlement gives the tribe specific irrigation rights in the Gila River. The government filed another water rights claim on behalf of the tribe in 1979, resulting in a 2006 Arizona Supreme Court decree that the 1935 decree resolved all of the tribe's rights under all theories and that federal court was the proper forum for interpretation and enforcement of that decree. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed a claim against the United States for failure to secure and protect the tribe's water rights. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the claim barred by the six-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. 2501. Rejecting an argument that the tribe was not on notice of its harm until the 2006 decision, the court stated that the plain terms of the 1935 decree indicated that the tribe would have no further rights and that the government was representing multiple parties.View "San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seasonal farm workers who relocated from Arizona to Oregon to work for Bear Creek Orchards, Inc. ("Bear Creek"), filed a class action lawsuit against Bear Creek alleging violations of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act and Oregon's minimum wage laws. At issue was whether certain on-site housing costs of seasonal farm workers could be credited toward the minimum wage set by Oregon law. Also at issue was whether Bear Creek violated Oregon law when it paid some of its workers a day later than it should have. The court held that Bear Creek violated Oregon law when it credited on-site housing costs towards its employees' minimum wage where on-site housing was necessary in order for Bear Creek to maintain an adequate workforce at the times and locations Bear Creek needed them. The court also held that Bear Creek violated Oregon law when it paid some of its workers the day after their last workday where the phrase in Oregon Revised Statutes 652.145, "whenever the employment terminates" was correctly interpreted to mean "on the last day the employee works."View "Elias Bobadilla-German, et al v. Bear Creek Orchards, Inc." on Justia Law

Debtors, owners and operators of a farm and ranch, appealed from the judgment of the bankruptcy court denying their discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 727(a)(5). The court held that the bankruptcy court did not clearly err in finding that debtors failed to adequately explain the loss of cattle. Accordingly, the judgment denying debtors' discharge was affirmed. View "Allred v. Vilhauer, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted after a three-day jury trial of four counts of injecting fluids into deep wells without a permit, in violation of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. 300h-2(b)(2). Defendant was also convicted of one count of making a "materially false" statement in a "matter within the jurisdiction" of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001(a)(2). Defendant timely appealed. The court affirmed Counts One through Four under section 300h-2(b)(2) and held that the government was required to prove only that defendant willfully injected water into a well more than eighteen feet deep without a permit, knowing that a permit was required under Idaho law; the reference in 40 C.F.R. 147.650(a)(7) to specific provisions of Idaho law, including those applicable to permitting, make clear that the entire Idaho permitting process was approved and incorporated into the SDWA; and that section 300h-2(b)(2) did not exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. The court affirmed Count Five under section 1001(a)(2) where defendant made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that its limiting instruction and the stipulation cured any possible prejudice that might have been caused by the three references to "waste" and brief display. The court also held that testimony from a supervisor at the Idaho Department of Agriculture was used for the purpose of showing that defendant injected fluids "willfully" and that the testimony was a small part of the evidence presented to the jury that defendant acted "willfully." Thus, if there was any error in presenting the testimony, the error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law