Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Several businesses involved in the cultivation, distribution, and sale of hemp products in Wyoming and elsewhere challenged a Wyoming statute, Senate Enrolled Act 24 (SEA 24), which significantly altered the state’s regulation of hemp. SEA 24 narrowed the definition of hemp to exclude synthetic substances and expanded the definition of THC to include both delta-9 and delta-8 THC, requiring that the combined concentration not exceed 0.3%. The law also added both naturally occurring and synthetic delta-8 THC to Wyoming’s Schedule I controlled substances, making it unlawful to manufacture, deliver, or possess hemp products exceeding the new THC limits or containing synthetic substances, even if such products are legal under federal law.After SEA 24 was enacted, the plaintiffs filed a preenforcement action in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They argued that SEA 24 was preempted by the federal 2018 Farm Bill, violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, constituted an unconstitutional regulatory taking, and was void for vagueness. The plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect. The district court denied the motion for preliminary relief and subsequently dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that most defendants were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the remaining claims lacked legal merit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked a substantial federal right to support their preemption claim, failed to demonstrate a Dormant Commerce Clause violation, did not establish a regulatory taking of their commercial personal property, and did not show that SEA 24 was unconstitutionally vague. The court also dismissed the appeal of the denial of preliminary relief as moot due to the dismissal of the complaint. View "Green Room v. State of Wyoming" on Justia Law

A group of out-of-state pig farmers and a pork processor challenged a Massachusetts law that prohibits the use of certain confinement methods for breeding pigs (specifically, gestation crates) and bans the sale in Massachusetts of pork products derived from pigs confined in such a manner. The plaintiffs, who operate outside Massachusetts and use these confinement methods, argued that the law discriminates against out-of-state producers and is preempted by federal statutes. The law was enacted by ballot initiative and became enforceable after the Supreme Court’s decision in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed most of the plaintiffs’ claims, including those based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, preemption by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Packers and Stockyards Act (PSA), the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Import-Export Clause. The court allowed the dormant Commerce Clause claim to proceed, but ultimately granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs on that claim as well, after severing a provision of the law that it found discriminatory (the “slaughterhouse exemption”). The court found that the remaining provisions of the law did not discriminate against out-of-state interests and did not impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts law does not discriminate against out-of-state producers in purpose or effect, does not impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test, and is not preempted by the FMIA or PSA. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Due Process Clause, and Import-Export Clause. The court found no procedural error in the district court’s handling of the case. View "Triumph Foods, LLC v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Bryan and Ami Hauxwell, farmers using ground and surface water for irrigation, submitted a request to pool ground water from several registered wells for the 2023-2027 allocation period. The Middle Republican Natural Resources District (NRD) denied their application, citing a rule that allows denial for any reason, including rule violations. The denial was communicated through a letter and a marked application. The Hauxwells challenged this denial, alleging it violated their constitutional rights and was arbitrary and capricious.The Hauxwells filed a petition for review with the district court for Frontier County, Nebraska, under the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act (NGWMPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They argued that the denial was contrary to a court order staying penalties previously imposed by the NRD. The NRD moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the letter was not a final agency action or an order in a contested case, and thus not subject to judicial review under the APA. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the letter did not arise from a contested case and was not a final order of the decision-making body.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the letter denying the Hauxwells' pooling application was not an "order" as defined under the NGWMPA. The court explained that the term "order" in the NGWMPA includes orders required by the act, a rule or regulation, or a decision adopted by the board of directors of a natural resources district. However, the letter in question did not meet these criteria, as it was not issued as part of any case or proceeding and was not required by any specific authority. Consequently, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. View "Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD" on Justia Law

Petitioners Jason Fabrizius and Fabrizius Livestock LLC sought review of a USDA Judicial Officer's order that denied their appeal of two USDA ALJ orders. The ALJ found Fabrizius Livestock responsible for ensuring animals transported interstate had required documentation and issued a $210,000 fine against the company. Fabrizius Livestock, a Colorado corporation dealing in horses, often sold horses intended for slaughter and kept them in conditions that made them vulnerable to disease. The company sold horses across state lines without the necessary documentation, including ICVIs and EIA test results.The ALJ found Fabrizius liable for violations of the CTESA and AHPA regulations, including transporting horses without owner/shipper certificates and selling horses without ICVIs. The ALJ imposed a $210,000 fine, which included penalties for each violation. Fabrizius appealed to a USDA Judicial Officer, arguing that the regulation was unconstitutionally vague, they were not among the "persons responsible," they lacked adequate notice, the fine was arbitrary and capricious, and the fine was excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The Judicial Officer rejected these arguments and affirmed the ALJ's orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the regulation was not unconstitutionally vague and provided adequate notice. The court found that the term "persons responsible" reasonably included sellers like Fabrizius. The court also held that the $200,000 fine for the AHPA violations was not arbitrary or capricious, as the Judicial Officer had considered all relevant factors. Finally, the court found that the fine was not excessive under the Eighth Amendment, given the gravity of the violations and the potential harm to the equine industry. The court denied the petition for review. View "Fabrizius v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a lower court's decision that an Iowa law violated the First Amendment. The law prohibited accessing an agricultural production facility under false pretenses or making a false statement or misrepresentation as part of a job application at such a facility, with the intent to cause physical or economic harm or other injury to the facility. Various organizations challenged this law, arguing it was unconstitutional as it was "viewpoint-based", targeting speakers with negative views of agricultural production facilities. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa agreed and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, enjoining officials from enforcing the law. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that the law was constitutional as it restricted intentionally false speech carried out to cause a legally recognized harm. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the judgment, vacated the injunction, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

California’s Proposition 12 forbids the in-state sale of whole pork meat that comes from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) that are “confined in a cruel manner.” Confinement is “cruel” if it prevents a pig from “lying down, standing up, fully extending [its] limbs, or turning around freely.” Opponents alleged that Proposition 12 violated the Constitution by impermissibly burdening interstate commerce, arguing that the cost of compliance with Proposition 12 will increase production costs and, because California imports almost all the pork it consumes, most of Proposition 12’s compliance costs will be borne by out-of-state firms.The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the case, rejecting arguments under the dormant Commerce Clause. Absent purposeful discrimination, a state may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to the interests of its citizens. Proposition 12 imposes the same burdens on in-state pork producers that it imposes on out-of-state pork producers. Proposition 12 does not implicate the antidiscrimination principle.The Court rejected an argument that its precedents include an “almost per se” rule forbidding enforcement of state laws that have the practical effect of controlling commerce outside the state, even when those laws do not purposely discriminate against out-of-state interests. While leaving the courtroom door open to challenges premised on even nondiscriminatory burdens, the Court noted that “extreme caution is warranted.” View "National Pork Producers Council v. Ross" on Justia Law

The Sixth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying the motion filed by Protect the Peninsula, Inc. to intervene as a matter of right in an action brought by a group of wineries and an association representing their interests (collectively, the Wineries) against a Michigan municipality over several zoning ordinances that regulate vineyards, holding that the district court erred.Protect the Peninsula, Inc., a local advocacy group, moved to intervene in this action brought against Peninsula Township challenging the zoning ordinances regulating the vineyards' activities as unconstitutional and in violation of state laws. Protect the Peninsula moved to intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), but the district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that Protect the Peninsula satisfied each of Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements. View "Wineries of the Old Mission Peninsula Ass'n v. Township of Peninsula, Michigan" on Justia Law

The Hopkinses kept cattle on their Marshall County, Tennessee farm. Detective Nichols received a complaint about the treatment of those cattle, drove by, and observed one dead cow and others that did not appear to be in good health. Nichols returned with Tennessee Department of Agriculture Veterinarian Johnson. Wearing his gun and badge, Nichols knocked and. according to Mrs. Hopkins, “demanded that [she] escort them to see the cattle,” refusing to wait until Mr. Hopkins returned or until she fed her children. Johnson completed a Livestock Welfare Examination, as required by law, noting that the cattle were not in reasonable health, that they lacked access to appropriate water, food, or shelter, and that major disease issues were present; she determined that probable cause for animal cruelty existed. Nichols returned to the Hopkins’s farm several times and discovered a sinkhole containing the remains of multiple cattle. Nichols and Sheriff Lamb eventually seized the cattle without a warrant and initiated criminal proceedings. The cattle were sold.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion for qualified immunity in a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Forced compliance with orders is a Fourth Amendment seizure; words that compel compliance with orders to exit a house constitute a seizure. While the open fields doctrine allowed the officers to lawfully search the farm, it did not give them lawful access to seize the cattle; they lacked exigent circumstances when they seized the cattle. View "Hopkins v. Nichols" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and numerous intervenors filed suit challenging the Forest Service's issuance of the Roadless Rule, which prohibits (with some exceptions) all road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting in inventoried roadless areas on National Forest System lands. After the district court dismissed the case on statute-of-limitations grounds, the DC Circuit reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted the summary-judgment motions of the Agriculture Department and its intervenor supporters. After briefing but before oral argument, the Agriculture Department granted Alaska's request to conduct a rulemaking to redetermine whether to exempt the Tongass National Forest from the Roadless Rule. The DC Circuit ordered the appeals stayed pending completion of the rulemaking, and on October 29, 2020, the Agriculture Department issued a final rule exempting the Tongass from the Roadless Rule.The DC Circuit concluded that Alaska's claims regarding application of the Roadless Rule to the Tongass National Forest are moot, and dismissed these claims and vacated those portions of the district court's decision regarding the Tongass. The court dismissed the remaining claims on appeal for lack of standing. View "Alaska v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Iowa Code Sec. 717A.3A(1)(a)-(b), which makes it a crime for a person to gain access to an agricultural production facility by false pretenses and to make false statements on an employment application to such a facility, on First Amendment grounds. The district court ruled that both provisions were unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the provisions providing that a person is guilty of agricultural production facility fraud if they obtain access to the facility by false pretenses is consistent with the First Amendment because it prohibits exclusively lies associated with a legally cognizable harm - namely trespass to private property. The court explained that the proscription of the Employment Provision does not require that false statements made as part of an employment application be material to the employment decision. Therefore, the statute is not limited to false claims that are made "to effect" an offer of employment; it allows for prosecution of those who make false statements that are not capable of influencing an offer of employment. The court concluded that, given the breadth of the Employment Provision, it proscribes speech that is protected by the First Amendment and does not satisfy strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, vacating the injunction against enforcement of the access provision. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds" on Justia Law