Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate orders to maintain stable markets for agricultural products. The marketing order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee, which requires that growers set aside a percentage of their crop, free of charge. The government sells the reserve raisins in noncompetitive markets, donates them, or disposes of them by any means consistent with the purposes of the program. If any profits are left over after subtracting administration expenses, the net proceeds are distributed back to the growers. In 2002–2003, growers were required to set aside 47 percent of their raisin crop; in 2003–2004, 30 percent. The Hornes refused to set aside any raisins on the ground that the reserve requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for public use without just compensation. The government fined them the fair market value of the raisins, with additional civil penalties. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit held that the requirement was not a Fifth Amendment taking. The Supreme Court reversed. The Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay just compensation when it takes personal property, just as when it takes real property. The reserve requirement is a clear physical taking. Actual raisins are transferred. Any net proceeds the growers receive from the sale of the reserve raisins goes to the amount of compensation, but does not mean the raisins have not been taken. This taking cannot be characterized as part of a voluntary exchange for a valuable government benefit. The ability to sell produce in interstate commerce, while subject to reasonable government regulation, is not a “benefit” that the government may withhold unless growers waive constitutional protections. The Court noted that just compensation can be measured by the market value the government already calculated when it fined the Hornes. View "Horne v. Dep't of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Bohr Farms owned and operated a concentrated animal feeding operation (CAFO) that accommodated more than 4,000 hogs. Cargill Pork, LLC owned the hogs. Appellants, several landowners and other individuals, brought this action against Cargill and Bohr Farms (together, Respondents), alleging damages for temporary nuisance, negligence, and conspiracy due to alleged offensive odors that emanated from the CAFO. Appellants did not claim damages for diminution in rental value or documented medical costs as authorized by Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.296.2, but, rather, alleged that their damages for temporary nuisance consisted solely of the loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding, inter alia, that section 537.296 was constitutional and did not authorize an award of damages for Appellants’ alleged loss of use and enjoyment of their property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 537.296 is constitutional; and (2) Appellants’ nuisance, conspiracy and vicarious liability claims are inseparable from the nuisance allegations and are therefore barred by section 537.296.6(1). View "Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

This long-running dispute over Puerto Rico’s dairy industry resulted in the principal parties settling. Pursuant to the settlement, the Department of Agriculture for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and others (collectively, the "Department") agreed to promulgate a regulation that would significantly rework the pricing and structure of the dairy market. Intervenors Industria Lechera de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Indulac") and the Puerto Rico Dairy Farmers Association, who were excluded from the bargaining table, objected to the settlement, alleging that the regulation violated Puerto Rico’s constitutional and statutory law. The district court approved the settlement agreement. Indulac appealed. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear Indulac’s appeal because it was untimely. View "Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Industria Lechera de P.R., Inc." on Justia Law

AMI filed suit challenging the 2013 rule adopted by AMS, a branch of the Department of Agriculture, that modified its prior rule implementing Congress's requirements of country-of-origin labeling (COOL), 7 U.S.C. 1638a. The 2013 rule requires retailers of "muscle cuts" of meat to list the countries of origin and production steps occurring in each country. AMS's previous rule only required a list of the countries of origin preceded by the phrase "Product of." The 2013 rule also eliminated the prior rule's allowance of commingling. AMI argued that compulsion to make the disclosures required by the 2013 rule exceeded the authority granted by the COOL statute and violated its First Amendment rights. The court concluded that AMI was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claims and that any error in the district court's balancing of the other factors governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction could not on these facts outweigh the likely outcome on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying AMI's motion for a preliminary injunction halting enforcement of the 2013 rule. View "American Meat Institute, et al. v. AGRI, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action arguing that the sodium content in a "serving" of sunflower seeds must include the sodium contained in the edible coating. The court concluded that, because the coating is edible and is intended to be edible, the portion of the edible coating on the shell of the sunflower seed must be accounted for in the calculation of the sodium content. Because plaintiff's state-law claims, if successful, would impose no greater burden than those imposed by federal law, her state law claims were not preempted. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Lilly v. ConAgra Foods" on Justia Law

Butler County Diary, LLC (BCD) requested a permit to install a liquid livestock manure pipeline under a public road. Read Township and Butler County cited two regulations it had adopted governing livestock confinement facilities in denying BCD's request. BCD challenged the regulations, alleging that the regulations were invalid and unenforceable. The district court ruled that the Township had the statutory authority to enact the regulations and that they were not preempted by the Livestock Waste Management Act or Nebraska's Department of Environmental Quality livestock waste control regulations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Township had the statutory authority to enact the pertinent regulations and the regulations were not preempted by state statute or regulation. View "Butler County Dairy, LLC v. Butler County" on Justia Law

Appellants, almond producers, claimed that the Secretary of Agriculture, seeking to prevent the spread of salmonella, exceeded his authority in requiring California almonds sold domestically to be treated with heat or chemicals. The district court granted summary judgment for the Secretary. The court affirmed, finding that appellants have waived their claims by failing to raise them during the rulemaking process. View "Koretoff, et al v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owns three tracts, zoned agricultural, and challenged a 2009 amendment to the Winnebago County zoning ordinance that makes it easier to obtain permission to build a wind farm. She claimed that a wind farm on adjacent land would deprive the property “of the full extent of the kinetic energy of the wind and air as it enters the property, subjecting it to shadow flicker and reduction of light, severe noise, possible ice throw and blade throws, interference with radar, cell phone, GPS, television, and other wireless communications, increased likelihood of lightening damage and stray voltage. increased electromagnetic radiation, prevention of crop dusting, drying out her land, and killing raptors. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, characterizing the claim as simply that a wind farm adjacent to plaintiff’s property would be a nuisance. There is no merit to the claim that the amendment violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is a “modest legislative encouragement of wind farming,” within the constitutional authority, state as well as federal, of a local government.View "Muscarello v. Winnebago Cnty. Bd." on Justia Law

In 1978, Hages acquired a ranch in Nevada occupying approximately 7,000 acres of private land and approximately 752,000 acres of federal lands under grazing permits. Their predecessors had acquired water rights now located on federal lands, 43 U.S.C. 661. Hages had disputes with the government concerning release of non-indigenous elk onto federal land for which Hages had grazing permits, unauthorized grazing by Hages’ cattle, and fence and ditch maintenance. After a series of incidents, in 1991, Hages filed suit alleging takings under 43 U.S.C. 1752(g), and breach of contract. After almost 20 years, the Claims Court awarded compensation for regulatory taking of water rights; physical taking of water rights; and range improvements. The court awarded pre-judgment interest for the takings, but not for the range improvements. The Federal Circuit vacated in part. The regulatory takings claim and 43 U.S.C. 1752 claim are not ripe. To the extent the claim for physical taking relies on fences constructed 1981-1982, it is untimely. To the extent the physical takings claim relies on fences constructed 1988-1990, there is no evidence that water was taken that Hages could have put to beneficial use. Hages are not entitled to pre-judgment interest for range improvements because Hages failed to identify a cognizable property interest. View "Hage v. United States" on Justia Law

The National Chicken Council, National Meat Association, and National Turkey Federation petitioned for review of EPA's interpretation of a provision in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The EPA interpreted the provision to mean that certain ethanol plants fired with natural gas and/or biomass were deemed to be in compliance with a reduction requirement indefinitely rather than for a certain period. Petitioners argued that by permitting qualifying ethanol plants to generate Renewable Identification Numberss indefinitely without having to ensure their ethanol met the emissions-reduction requirement, the ethanol plants would produce more ethanol, which would lead to an increase in the demand for corn, which would lead to an increase in the price of corn. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner's petition for review for lack of standing, as Petitioners failed to show that a favorable ruling would redress their claimed injuries. View "Nat'l Chicken Council v. EPA " on Justia Law