Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court in favor of Respondents in this declaratory and injunctive relief action challenging a series of regulatory amendments proposed by the Missouri Conservation Commission that banned the importation of cervids in an attempt to eradicate chronic wasting disease.Appellants sued Respondents to prevent the amended regulations from going into effect. The circuit court declared the challenged regulations invalid and enjoined the Commission from enforcing them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Commission has authority under Mo. Const. art. IV, 40(a) to regulate Respondents’ captive cervids as “wildlife” and “game”; (2) Respondents’ captive cervids are subject to regulation by the Commission under article IV, section 40(a) because they are “resources of the state”; and (3) and circuit court erred in concluding that the regulations were invalid and could not be enforced because they impermissibly infringed on Respondents’ right to farm under Mo. Const. art. I, 35. View "Hill v. Missouri Department of Conservation" on Justia Law

Sunrise, an Ohio agricultural cooperative, owns one-third of Lund, which sells crop insurance. Sunrise pays “patronage,” a rebate, to its Ohio and Michigan members based on how much Lund insurance they buy. The Risk Management Agency (RMA) within the USDA, administers Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) programs. Patronage payments were prohibited until 2000, when Congress authorized some rebating if permitted under state law. Congress changed course in 2008, prohibiting patronage payments with a grandfather clause, 7 U.S.C. 1508(a)(9)(B)(iii) stating that the prohibition does not apply to a patronage dividend paid: “by an entity that was approved by the [FCIC] to make such payments for the 2005, 2006, or 2007 reinsurance year.” From 2008-2016, Sunrise was approved to pay patronage as a “grandfathered” entity. In 2016, another farming cooperative, Trupointe, merged into Sunrise. Trupointe had 4100 members, did not sell crop insurance, and was not eligible to pay patronage. Sunrise argued to the RMA that under Ohio law and federal tax law, when one company merges into another, the surviving company is the same entity that existed before the merger. The RMA disagreed, concluding that the merger would make Sunrise ineligible to pay patronage and defining “entity” to mean the same entity that it approved for any of the 2005-2007 reinsurance years, with the same structure and relative size; any mergers would be considered a different entity, regardless of name or how taxed. The Sixth Circuit held that the agency was not permitted to impose additional eligibility requirements on approved entities that are unmoored from the statute. View "Sunrise Cooperative v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a putative class action complaint alleging that Abbott violated New York and California statutes and common law by advertising and selling Similac infant formula branded as organic and bearing the "USDA Organic" seal when the formula contained ingredients not permitted by the Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA). The court held that plaintiffs' claims were preempted by federal law and the court need not address Abbott's remaining arguments based on primary jurisdiction, failure to exhaust, or failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that there was no way to rule in plaintiffs' favor without contradicting the certification decision, and thus the certification scheme that Congress enacted in the OFPA. View "Marentette v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

The National Organic Standards Board, an advisory committee, has 15 members, all appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture, 7 U.S.C.6518(b), (c); its principal task is advising the Secretary what belongs on the “National List of approved and prohibited substances that shall be included in the standards for organic production and handling” Plaintiffs, who operate organic farms, asked the Secretary to appoint them to the Board, but the Secretary appointed Beck and Swaffar. Plaintiffs contend that Beck and Swaffar are ineligible to fill the seats to which they were appointed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for lack of standing. Beck and Swaffer, appointed to seats reserved for “individuals who own or operate an organic farming operation,” were office employees of agribusinesses that produce some organic products and some non-organic products. Plaintiffs argued that by deflecting the Board from making recommendations most likely to promote organic farmers’ interests, Beck and Swaffar have called organic-farming into disrepute and reduced organic sales; that is not the kind of person-specific loss needed to show standing. Any injury plaintiffs assert could not be redressed by a favorable decision. The Secretary has a statutory right to appoint Board members but no corresponding duty to evaluate any particular applicant. View "Cornucopia Institute v. United States Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

Brandon Barrick brought an action under the False Claims Act on behalf of the United States, alleging his former employer Parker-Migliorini International (PMI) illegally smuggled beef into Japan and China. At the time of the scheme, China banned all imports of U.S. beef, and Japan imposed heightened standards, under which certain types of U.S. beef would have been banned. Barrick alleged PMI cheated the government out of the inspection fees that would have been paid if PMI had complied with federal law. In Barrick’s view, an “obligation” to pay the government arose when the USDA was informed that meat was being exported to a country with inspection standards higher than those in the United States. Thus, the government should have been paid for the inspections that would have occurred if PMI had accurately reported the destination countries. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Barrick's reasoning: "[a]n established duty is one owed at the time the improper conduct occurred, not a duty dependent on a future discretionary act." Here, the obligation would not have arisen absent a third-party meat supplier’s independent wrongful conduct. This was because the meat supplier supplied the destination country to the USDA, thus controlling the type of inspection performed. But PMI did not use meat suppliers who were eligible to export beef to Japan. So, for an obligation to arise, the supplier would have had to report an accurate - and illegal - destination country to the USDA, even though the supplier was not eligible to export to that country. This conduct does not create an established duty under the Act. Because the Court did not find Barrick could adequately plead the existence of such an “obligation” by PMI as the Act required, it affirmed the district court’s denial of Barrick’s motion for leave to amend. View "United States ex rel. Barrick v. Parker-Migliorini Int'l" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court vacated in part the judgment of the superior court affirming in part the Department of Environmental Protection’s partial denial of Appellants’ Freedom of Access Act (FOAA) request for public records related to Dubois Livestock, Inc. While the Department provided a substantial set of records to Appellants, it denied access to records that would be privileged against discovery or use as evidence in the course of a court proceeding. The Supreme Judicial Court (1) affirmed the superior court’s judgment as to the records that were withheld pursuant to the work product privilege; but (2) vacated the superior court’s judgment as to the records that were withheld based on the informant identity privilege, holding that there were factual disputes regarding findings necessary to a determination that there was “just and proper cause” for the Department’s withholding of records containing the identities of complainants. View "Dubois v. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

USI petitioned for review of the FSIS's determination that the packaging used by USI was misbranded under the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1907 (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. 601 et seq., because its label included the FSIS inspection identification number of its supplier without the latter's permission. The D.C. Circuit denied the petition for review and held that FSIS's determination that USI's labeling was misleading was neither arbitrary nor capricious where the Administrator noted that the FSIS permits a re-boxer to use its supplier's establishment number only if the supplier consents to the practice, and USI had not provided document as requested, showing consent of the official establishment. View "United Source One, Inc. v. US Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The plain language of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 3-1261(B), which provides that no two brands of the same design or figure shall be adopted or recorded, precluded the Arizona Department of Agriculture (Department) from recording “two brands of the same design or figure” regardless of their location.The Department in this case allowed Eureka Springs to record a “bar seven” brand, even though it was identical to a previously recorded brand owned by David Stambaugh, because it was placed on a different location on the cattle. Stambaugh sued the Department. The superior court granted summary judgment in part for the Department, concluding that section 3-1261 gave the Department discretion to consider the location of a brand on an animal in determining whether two brands are of the same design or figure. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that section 3-1261(B) is ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was unambiguous and precluded the Department from adopting or recording identical brands. View "Stambaugh v. Killian" on Justia Law

The plain language of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 3-1261(B), which provides that no two brands of the same design or figure shall be adopted or recorded, precluded the Arizona Department of Agriculture (Department) from recording “two brands of the same design or figure” regardless of their location.The Department in this case allowed Eureka Springs to record a “bar seven” brand, even though it was identical to a previously recorded brand owned by David Stambaugh, because it was placed on a different location on the cattle. Stambaugh sued the Department. The superior court granted summary judgment in part for the Department, concluding that section 3-1261 gave the Department discretion to consider the location of a brand on an animal in determining whether two brands are of the same design or figure. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that section 3-1261(B) is ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute was unambiguous and precluded the Department from adopting or recording identical brands. View "Stambaugh v. Killian" on Justia Law

The Animal Welfare Act does not directly address license renewal but does expressly authorize the USDA to promulgate and implement its own renewal standards. PETA filed suit challenging the license renewal process for animal exhibitors promulgated by the USDA through which the USDA may renew such license despite a licensee's noncompliance with the Act. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the USDA's Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court agreed with the Eleventh Circuit that the Act's licensing regulations embody a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policy interests Congress has delegated to the USDA and were entitled to Chevron deference. View "PETA v. USDA" on Justia Law