Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Between April 23 and June 1, 2008, there were 57 reported cases of salmonellosis. The FDA, federal and state agencies, and food industry began an investigation to determine the source of contamination. On June 3, 2008, the FDA issued a press release alerting consumers that the salmonella outbreak “appears to be linked” to the consumption of “raw red plum, red Roma, or round red tomatoes” and that “the source of the contaminated tomatoes may be limited to a single grower or packer or tomatoes from a specific geographic area.” Later, a spokesman stated the FDA suspected the contaminated tomatoes had been shipped from Florida or Mexico, and red plum, red Roma, and red round tomatoes were “incriminated with the outbreak.” A third press release announced that “fresh tomatoes now available in the domestic market are not associated with the current outbreak.” Although the link between the salmonella outbreak and the their tomatoes was eventually disproved, tomato producers alleged that all or almost all of the value of the perishable tomatoes was destroyed due to a decrease in market demand. The Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal on grounds that the warning of a possible link between the tomatoes and an outbreak did not effect a regulatory taking. View "DiMare Fresh, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved the raisins. One of the California Marketing Act of 1937's (CMA) requirements was that the Secretary of California’s Department of Food and Agriculture, in adopting a marketing order for industry advertising or research, must find that the order “will tend to effectuate the declared purposes and policies of [the CMA].” The trial court: (1) concluded that this requirement could be met only if “the [o]rder was necessary to address adverse economic conditions in the raisin-growing industry that were so severe as to threaten the continued viability of the industry”; (2) invalidated the advertising and research marketing order challenged here because there was insufficient evidence showing such economic conditions; and (3) found, on these same grounds, that the Department improperly exercised the police power in adopting the marketing order. The Court of Appeal found the trial court’s interpretation of this requirement of the CMA, which Karen Ross, the Secretary, appealed, erroneously limited the CMA’s applicability, as to marketing orders for industry advertising or research, only to Great Depression-like economic circumstances. Consequently, the Court reversed the judgment, which mooted the cross-appeal of Lion Raisins, Inc., and Lion Farms LLC (formerly Lion Brothers) (the cross-appeal concerns the proper calculation of the assessment refund for the invalidated marketing order), and remand the matter for the trial court to consider the other challenges to the marketing order that the raisin companies raised. View "California v. Raisin Valley Farms" on Justia Law

Following the insolvency of Pierce Elevator, Inc. (PEI), the Nebraska Public Service Commission (PSC) initiated proceedings to determine claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. After PEI voluntarily surrendered its grain warehouse license to the PSC, the PSC took title to all PEI grain in storage in trust for distribution to all valid owners, depositors, or storers of grain pursuant to the Grain Warehouse Act. The PSC then determined valid claims under the Grain Warehouse Act and the Grain Dealer Act. The appellant and cross-appellants in this case were claimants who challenged the PSC’s classification of their claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and in part reversed and dismissed, holding (1) the PSC correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the fraud claims of the appellant and some cross-appellants and that the appellant and other-cross appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; (2) the PSC erred in finding that some cross-appellants were not entitled to recovery under the Grain Warehouse Act; and (3) some cross-appellants did not have standing to challenge the classification of a certain transaction. View "In re Claims Against Pierce Elevator" on Justia Law

California Exposition and State Fairs (Cal Expo), regulated by Food and Agriculture Code 3301, is responsible for organizing the State Fair every July and enters into an agreement every year with the University of California at Davis School of Veterinary Medicine. The School sets up and manages the livestock nursery exhibit where pregnant pigs and other animals are put on display for three weeks to give birth and nurse. Cal Expo provides the land, tent, support infrastructure, and financial compensation, while the School provides the animals, equipment, and staff. Transporting pigs during the last two weeks of their pregnancy causes suffering due to stress and physical discomfort, potentially resulting in an aborted pregnancy. At the fair, the School places the pregnant pigs in farrowing crates, so small that the mother pigs cannot turn around or walk, for the three-week duration of the State Fair. Plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting a section 526a taxpayer action, premised on the theory that defendants waste taxpayer money and staff time by obtaining, transporting, and exhibiting pregnant pigs. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, agreeing that California’s animal cruelty laws (Pen. Code, 597, 597t.)are not enforceable through a taxpayer action. View "Animal Legal Def.Fund v. CA Exposition & St. Fairs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Duarte Nursery, Inc. sold grape rootstock. It challenged mandatory assessments it had to pay to the California Grape Rootstock Improvement Commission to help fund research for pest-resistant and drought-resistant rootstock, arguing this “Commission Law” and the Commission’s operation as an unconstitutional exercise of the state’s police power in violation of plaintiff’s liberty interests and due process rights under the federal and state Constitutions. In this appeal, instead of claiming impairment of its rights to free speech or free association, plaintiff asserted a right to refuse to help fund research that benefitted the industry as a whole. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief and refunds. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, the Commission and the Secretary of the California Department of Food and Agriculture (Secretary). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Duarte Nursery v. Cal. Grape Rootstock Improvement Comm." on Justia Law

PETA filed suit against the USDA, arguing that the USDA's failure to craft avian-specific animal welfare regulations pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act (AWA), 7 U.S.C. 2131 et seq., violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(1). The district court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the USDA’s enforcement decisions are committed by law to its discretion. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that PETA has organizational standing. On the merits, the court concluded that, even if the USDA has adopted an interim policy of non-enforcement pending the adoption of bird-specific regulations, as PETA alleges, nothing in the AWA requires the USDA to apply the general animal welfare standards to birds before it has promulgated more appropriate bird-specific regulations. In this case, the USDA has not failed to take action where, even assuming that the USDA is compelled by law to act, the court has no power to say that it must do so before finalizing its bird-specific regulations, at least in light of PETA’s abandonment of its argument that the USDA “unreasonably delayed” enforcement. Further, the AWA's mandatory licensure requirement is not directed to the USDA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "PETA v. USDA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law

The “Swampbuster” provisions of the Food Security Act deny certain farm-program benefits to persons who convert a wetland for agricultural purposes, 16 U.S.C. 3821. Smith challenged the USDA’s determination that Smith had converted 2.24 acres of wetland and was, therefore totally ineligible for benefits. Smith claimed that the Department erred in failing to: analyze whether his purported conversion would have only a minimal effect on surrounding wetlands, a finding that would exempt him from ineligibility; consider factors that would reduce his penalties; and exempt Smith’s parcel because it was originally converted and farmed before the enactment. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that, while this case only involves 2.24 acres, it has ramifications for thousands of corn and soybean farmers. The USDA had signed a mediation agreement with Smith, permitting him to plant the parcel in the spring and cut down trees so long as Smith did not remove stumps; USDA never argued that Smith intentionally violated this agreement, but permanently deprived him of benefits, in disregard of its own regulations. That Smith’s stance on mitigation may have “colored” the agency’s relationship with him does not mean that USDA is entitled to ignore minimal-effect evidence and a penalty-reduction request. View "Maple Drive Farms Ltd. P'ship v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Maurice McGinnis sought a loan through federal farm credit programs and alleges that he was denied access to such programs by the Department because of his race. This appeal concerns McGinnis' participation in a claims process established by a class action settlement agreement to resolve his and other farmers' discrimination claims. The court concluded that Paragraph 13 of the Consent Decree empowers the District Court to correct an error by the facilitator in transmitting a claim to the wrong track. If it is true that McGinnis selected Track B and the facilitator nevertheless sent his claim package to the adjudicator, the district court did no more than enforce the parties' agreement. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that it could review the facilitator's claim processing and vacate the adjudicator's determination. The court concluded that McGinnis' request to change his claim to Track B was sufficiently close in time to his submission of the claim package, and the language of the Consent Decree defining what constitutes a "completed claim package" is sufficiently ambiguous, to justify the district court in granting his petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pigford v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

This long-running dispute over Puerto Rico’s dairy industry resulted in the principal parties settling. Pursuant to the settlement, the Department of Agriculture for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and others (collectively, the "Department") agreed to promulgate a regulation that would significantly rework the pricing and structure of the dairy market. Intervenors Industria Lechera de Puerto Rico, Inc. ("Indulac") and the Puerto Rico Dairy Farmers Association, who were excluded from the bargaining table, objected to the settlement, alleging that the regulation violated Puerto Rico’s constitutional and statutory law. The district court approved the settlement agreement. Indulac appealed. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to hear Indulac’s appeal because it was untimely. View "Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, Inc. v. Industria Lechera de P.R., Inc." on Justia Law