Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Arnaudo Brothers challenged the Board's award of make whole-relief based on the determination that the company's litigation of a disclaimer issue did not further the policies and purpose of the Agriculture Labor Relations Act of 1975. The Court of Appeal held that the Board did not err when it identified and applied the rules that define when a certified union has made a disclaimer of interest in representing the bargaining unit; determined the statement by the Union representative that "we’re through with you" (if made) was not a clear and unequivocal disclaimer of interest; and concluded the Union's subsequent conduct consistent with a disclaimer could not render the equivocal disclaimer effective. Finally, the principles set forth in Tri-Fanucchi Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1161, compelled the conclusion that the Board properly exercised its broad discretionary authority when it awarded make-whole relief in this case. View "Arnaudo Brothers v. ALRB" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Defendant Ray Domenico Farms, Inc. grew organic vegetables. Plaintiffs were three year-round and four seasonal migrant workers who had been previously employed by Domenico Farms from as far back as 1992. All Plaintiffs were paid by the hour, and alleged they never received overtime pay during their employment with Domenico Farms. While agricultural workers were generally exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime requirements, Plaintiffs alleged they performed nonagricultural tasks in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours, thus entitling them to overtime wages under FLSA for those weeks. The certified question from the federal court pertained to how far back in time a terminated employee’s unpaid wage claims could reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, sections 8-4-101 to -123, C.R.S. (2017). Specifically, the certified question asked whether the statute permitted a terminated employee to sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee’s employment, even when the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action the employee could have brought for those unpaid wages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103(1)(a). The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of section 109, an employee could seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination; however, the right to seek such wages or compensation was subject to the statute of limitations. That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination. Thus, the Court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado certified a question of Colorado law to the Colorado Supreme Court. Defendant Ray Domenico Farms, Inc. grew organic vegetables. Plaintiffs were three year-round and four seasonal migrant workers who had been previously employed by Domenico Farms from as far back as 1992. All Plaintiffs were paid by the hour, and alleged they never received overtime pay during their employment with Domenico Farms. While agricultural workers were generally exempt from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (“FLSA”) overtime requirements, Plaintiffs alleged they performed nonagricultural tasks in weeks in which they worked more than forty hours, thus entitling them to overtime wages under FLSA for those weeks. The certified question from the federal court pertained to how far back in time a terminated employee’s unpaid wage claims could reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, sections 8-4-101 to -123, C.R.S. (2017). Specifically, the certified question asked whether the statute permitted a terminated employee to sue for wages or compensation that went unpaid at any time during the employee’s employment, even when the statute of limitations had run on the cause of action the employee could have brought for those unpaid wages under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-4-103(1)(a). The Supreme Court held that under the plain language of section 109, an employee could seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination; however, the right to seek such wages or compensation was subject to the statute of limitations. That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two (or three) years immediately preceding termination. Thus, the Court answered the certified question in the negative. View "Hernandez v. Ray Domenico Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Silver Bait operates, on 750 acres in Tennessee, housing, growing, and packaging bait worms for sale to retailers. Silver Bait imports baby worms from Europe and feeds and grows them in seven concrete structures, 540 feet long and 50 feet wide, with a 10-foot wide tractor driveway down the center, with worm beds on either side. Durant grows his own corn in to ensure the quality of the feed. Workers send corn silage through a grinder and combine it with peat moss, lime, and water. Silver Bait also makes its own customized bait cups using an injection-molding machine. Believing its employees fell within a Fair Labor Standards Act exemption for agricultural workers, Silver Bait did not pay overtime. In 2010 the Department of Labor issued a report finding Silver Bait’s employees exempt, ordering Silver Bait to pay overtime for one four-week period when the company acted as a wholesaler, importing worms and immediately reselling them to retailers. After obtaining consent forms from other workers, employees filed a private action under 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The Sixth Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment in Silver Bait’s favor. Although not a specifically enumerated farming activity, there is little to distinguish Silver Bait from a traditional farm other than the unfamiliarity of worm farming. View "Barks v. Silver Bait LLC" on Justia Law

The court certified to the Washington Supreme Court the two questions: (1) Does the Washington Farm Labor Contractor Act, in particular Washington Revised Code 19.30.010(2), include in the definition of a “farm labor contractor” an entity who is paid a per-acre fee to manage all aspects of farming - including hiring and employing agricultural workers as well as making all planting and harvesting decisions, subject to approval - for a particular plot of land owned by a third party? and (2) Does the FLCA, in particular Washington Revised Code 19.30.200, make jointly and severally liable any person who uses the services of an unlicensed farm labor contractor without either inspecting the license issued by the director of the Department of Labor & Industries to the farm labor contractor or obtaining a representation from the director of the Department of Labor & Industries that the contractor is properly licensed, even if that person lacked knowledge that the farm labor contractor was unlicensed? View "Saucedo v. Farmland Mgmt. Serv." on Justia Law

Howes, the owner of a pickling cucumber farm, was found to be in violation of provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA). The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determinations that: Howes’ cucumber harvesters were employees, and not independent contractors, such that the FLSA protections apply; Howes controlled the facilities used to house the migrant farm workers in 2011, and was liable for violations of the MSPA in regard to the provision of substandard housing; and Howes unlawfully interfered with the Department of Labor investigation. View "Perez v. D. Howes, LLC" on Justia Law

Migrant workers who worked for defendant appealed a summary judgment in favor of defendant and against their complaint that defendant violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 203(m). At issue was whether an employer that hired migrant farm workers through the H-2A visa program was entitled to wage credits under the Act for housing and meals that federal law required the employer to provide the workers. The court deferred to the Secretary of Labor's interpretation that defendant could not credit the cost of housing in the wages paid to the workers and agreed with defendant that it was entitled to wage credits for the costs of meals for the workers. The court also concluded that defendant was not liable under principles of agency law for the fees that third parties charged the workers related to their efforts to obtain employment with defendant. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View " Ramos-Barrientos, et al. v. Bland, et al." on Justia Law