Justia Agriculture Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners, including various agricultural and trade organizations, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over a rule that set an equation for calculating vehicle fuel economy, specifically the "Ra factor." They argued that the Ra factor was set arbitrarily low, which effectively increased federal fuel economy standards and decreased demand for gasoline, harming their businesses.The case was reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The petitioners contended that the EPA's rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by ignoring significant comments and data that flagged flaws in the determination of the Ra factor. They pointed out that the EPA's test program used too few and outdated vehicles, included data from a malfunctioning vehicle, and excluded data from a properly functioning one. Additionally, they argued that the EPA failed to consider alternative data sources, such as manufacturer certification data, which showed a higher Ra factor.The Fifth Circuit found that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that the EPA did not adequately respond to significant comments that raised substantial issues with the test program's sample size, the representativeness of the vehicles tested, and the inclusion and exclusion of certain test data. The court also found that the EPA failed to justify its rejection of alternative data sources. As a result, the court held that the EPA did not demonstrate that its decision was the product of reasoned decision-making.The court granted the petition for review and vacated the portion of the EPA's rule that set and implemented the Ra factor of 0.81. The court concluded that there was no serious possibility that the EPA could substantiate its decision on remand, and thus, vacatur was the appropriate remedy. View "Texas Corn Producers v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, brothers who worked in the pest control industry, filed suit against LDAF and LDAF's Assistant Director David Fields, in his individual capacity, alleging various claims related to the hearings before LDAF for violations of Louisiana's Pest Control Laws, La. Stat. Ann. 3:3363. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants retaliated against them for complaining before the Commission and others. Because summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, summary judgment is also proper as to plaintiffs' state law claims. The court also concluded that summary judgment was properly granted as to the substantive due process claims. In this case, although plaintiffs may have a protected interest in being free from arbitrary state action not rationally related to a state purpose, they do not have a constitutional right to violate rules and regulations of the Louisiana Pest Control law. The record establishes a substantial basis for defendants’ actions and precludes any inference that such actions were arbitrary. Because Louisiana courts have found the due process protections in the Louisiana Constitution to be coextensive with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same determination applies to plaintiffs’ state law claims. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim fails because, assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause applies in this instance, the record indicates that each of plaintiffs' offenses resulted in fines that do not exceed the limits prescribed by the statute authorizing it. Under the facts established in the summary judgment record, plaintiffs' claims against David Fields failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cripps v. Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, brothers who worked in the pest control industry, filed suit against LDAF and LDAF's Assistant Director David Fields, in his individual capacity, alleging various claims related to the hearings before LDAF for violations of Louisiana's Pest Control Laws, La. Stat. Ann. 3:3363. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish sufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendants retaliated against them for complaining before the Commission and others. Because summary judgment was proper as to plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, summary judgment is also proper as to plaintiffs' state law claims. The court also concluded that summary judgment was properly granted as to the substantive due process claims. In this case, although plaintiffs may have a protected interest in being free from arbitrary state action not rationally related to a state purpose, they do not have a constitutional right to violate rules and regulations of the Louisiana Pest Control law. The record establishes a substantial basis for defendants’ actions and precludes any inference that such actions were arbitrary. Because Louisiana courts have found the due process protections in the Louisiana Constitution to be coextensive with the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same determination applies to plaintiffs’ state law claims. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim fails because, assuming that the Excessive Fines Clause applies in this instance, the record indicates that each of plaintiffs' offenses resulted in fines that do not exceed the limits prescribed by the statute authorizing it. Under the facts established in the summary judgment record, plaintiffs' claims against David Fields failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cripps v. Louisiana Dep't of Agriculture & Forestry" on Justia Law

The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), 7 U.S.C. 499e, is a Depression-era statute designed to protect sellers of perishable produce form delinquent purchasers. In this case, two such purchasers filed for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy court appointed special counsel to collect and disburse funds to PACA-protected sellers that had claims against the purchasers-turned-debtors. At issue on appeal is whether special counsel’s (Stokes) fees and expenses be disbursed from the PACA fund. Nowhere in the orders on the interim appeals is there an indication that the district court realized these were interlocutory orders and believed there was a benefit to hearing them in this piecemeal manner. That absence means the district court did not have appellate jurisdiction over the first two interim fee orders. Therefore the court vacated for lack of jurisdiction the district court’s order vacating the first and second fee awards. The court found that Kingdom Fresh has no standing to dispute the percentage of Stokes’s fee allocable to the nonobjecting parties. Only the small percentage of Stokes’s fee apportionable to Kingdom Fresh is at issue in this appeal; Stokes is free to keep the remainder. The court agreed with the Second Circuit that PACA’s unequivocal language requires that a PACA trustee - or in this case, its functional equivalent - may not be paid from trust assets “until full payment of the sums owing” is paid to all claimants. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order vacating the final fee award, but only as to Kingdom Fresh's pro rata share of the fees. View "Kingdom Fresh Produce, Inc., et al v. Delta Produc" on Justia Law